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Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsRecently, amid deteriorating relations between European leaders and US President Donald Trump, and Washington’s shift in security priorities from Europe to other parts of the world, there has been increasing discussion within the EU about the need to develop European strategic autonomy in the field of security.Basically, there's nothing new about this idea. It has gone through various stages: from the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954 to the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and later the European Security and Defence Policy, which led to the dissolution of the WEU in 2011.For many years, the EU’s practical role in the security domain was limited to conducting civilian and military crisis response operations. After all, no one doubted the effectiveness of the world’s strongest defence bloc – NATO – under whose protection Europe stood.Today, the situation has changed. Whether Washington will return to unconditionally fulfilling its obligations within the Alliance following the next change of administration in the US remains an unanswered question. Whether tens of thousands of American troops will be deployed to repel potential Russian attacks should the situation escalate is not known for certain. The same question applies to the EU’s access, if necessary, to NATO’s joint military assets, which are largely provided by the US.Consequently, much more is now expected from the concept of strategic security autonomy in the EU – the ability to respond swiftly to an adversary’s military actions, and the ability to defend Europe should the US withdraw. This response must take into account the experience of modern warfare, which the EU’s adversary – Russia – possesses, but which the member states do not. However, Ukraine does possess such experience. The response must involve European allies who are part of NATO but not members of the EU, namely the United Kingdom and Norway.It is in this context that the words of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen should be interpreted: that the European Union, in addition to its role as an ‘economic power’, must also become a ‘military power’. Programmes aimed at developing the European defence industry, to which significant funds are being allocated, are geared towards this. These objectives are served by four ‘flagship’ EU defence initiatives: countering drones, protection against missiles and other airborne threats, and strengthening the EU’s eastern borders. This explains the proposals for the creation of a European Defence Union involving Kyiv, London and Oslo, which are being promoted by European Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius.At the same time, discussions on whether a European Defence Union should be created and what form it should take are still ongoing both in the capitals and in Brussels, including within the European Commission itself. Should this lead to the formation of a new military alliance to replace or complement NATO? Should the EU act as the Alliance’s financial backbone in Europe and only address specific problem areas that have emerged in the context of Russia’s large-scale aggression? Would the creation of a new union lead to confusion in decision-making and the chain of command, which is particularly dangerous during a conflict?There is no single view on this in Kyiv either. On the one hand, President Zelenskyy has supported the idea of Ukraine’s participation in a European defence union. On the other hand, Ukraine is not ruling out NATO membership as the foundation of its future security.Time will tell what the outcome of this debate will be. In any case, the realities will dictate to Europeans the need, firstly, to develop their own military capabilities, particularly in areas where they are currently dependent on the US, and secondly, to involve Ukraine in the defence of Europe, as it is currently the strongest military power on the continent, capable of standing up to a common enemy.

Recently, amid deteriorating relations between European leaders and US President Donald Trump, and Washington’s shift in security priorities from Europe to other parts of the world, there has been increasing discussion within the EU about the need to develop European strategic autonomy in the field of security.

A European Defence Union – a prospect for the future?

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsThe month-long ceasefire in Iran has once again been called into question. US President Donald Trump has described Tehran’s response to American peace initiatives as completely unacceptable.Washington’s latest proposal called for an end to the war, the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and the rollback of Iran’s nuclear programme. However, the Iranians perceived this as a demand for surrender.The Iranian news agency Tasnim reported that Tehran’s proposal, sent via the intermediary Pakistan, includes an immediate cessation of hostilities on all fronts, including the Lebanese one, an end to the US blockade of Iranian ports, and guarantees against further attacks on Iran. Furthermore, according to Iranian state television, Tehran continues to insist on military reparations from the US, full sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, and the lifting of sanctions and the unblocking of Iranian assets.The sharp change in the tone of Trump’s public statements regarding the prospects for peace talks in the Middle East has led to another surge in oil prices – by $4 per barrel.What Washington’s next steps will be remains unclear for now. However, following Trump’s recent announcement of the official end to military operations in Iran, it is difficult to predict a large-scale resumption of hostilities in the region. It is unlikely that the US Congress would view this as the start of a new military operation, which is not subject to legislative restrictions on its duration without the consent of lawmakers. Oil prices, as well as their potential impact on the results of the November mid-term elections to the US Congress, do not favour a military course of action.Another factor is the view of Israel, which the US President has effectively sidelined from decision-making on Iran. According to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in an interview with CBS News, “much has been achieved, but this is not the end… There are still enrichment facilities that need to be eliminated. There are still ‘proxies’ supported by Iran. There are ballistic missiles that they still want to produce.”Tel Aviv’s position, as well as its role in the escalation of the war in Iran, has proved not so straightforward for the American public. The unpopularity of the war in Iran, which is opposed by around 60% of Americans, and accusations that Trump launched military action under Netanyahu’s influence, have led to a decline in support for Israel in the US. According to a Pew Research Center poll conducted on 23–29 March, 60% of the American public view Israel negatively, and 59% have little or no trust in Netanyahu. Moreover, in both political parties, more than 50% of respondents view Israel and Netanyahu negatively.Anticipating this, Netanyahu stated in an interview with CBS that he wants to “reduce to zero” US financial support for the Israeli armed forces over the next decade. Under US law, this amounts to around $3.8 billion a year.Trump now finds himself in a ‘stalemate’ regarding Iran. He cannot sign a deal with Iran that is worse than that of his Democratic predecessor, Obama, whom he criticised so heavily for it. At the same time, Tehran is not offering a better one. He cannot resume military action without legal consequences and reputational damage. And continuing the blockade of Iranian ports, which is currently the only lever of pressure on Iran, cannot be sustained indefinitely due to oil prices and their impact on the November elections. Military support for Israel in an operation against Iran has long since turned from an advantage into a domestic political problem.A rare international consensus has emerged on the issue of Iran. Almost all interested parties, including Europe, China and the Arab states, are opposed to war. Nor do they support Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. However, they do not wish to assist Washington with military action, believing that Trump himself must resolve the problem he created, preferably through peaceful means. Moreover, some, such as Chinese leader Xi Jinping, seek to exploit the complexity of the US position for their own interests.The next test of Trump’s negotiating skills in foreign policy will take place very soon – on 13 May during his visit to Beijing.

The month-long ceasefire in Iran has once again been called into question. US President Donald Trump has described Tehran’s response to American peace initiatives as completely unacceptable. Washington’s latest proposal called for an end to the war, the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and the rollback of Iran’s nuclear programme. However, the Iranians perceived this as a demand for surrender.

Trump’s ‘Zugzwang’ in Iran

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsAs evidenced by US President Donald Trump’s latest statements, the actual outcomes of the American leader’s visit to China fall significantly short of the glowing assessments he made in his press statements.On the most important security issue for the US – Iran – the parties confirmed their unity on fundamental positions: the war must end, Tehran must not possess nuclear weapons, and the Strait of Hormuz must remain open. But this has been stated before. Beijing has never publicly contradicted Washington on key approaches to a settlement, whilst maintaining special relations with Tehran, both economic and, it is suspected, of a military nature.However, it is a long way from agreeing with the basic principles of a settlement to reaching agreements on exerting pressure on the Iranian leadership to ensure their implementation. During his visit, the Chinese leader signalled his readiness to play a more active role in resolving the Iran issue. However, the extent of this activity, as well as agreement with Washington on the details of the settlement (in terms of the sequence of steps and the protection of Tehran’s interests), remain in question for now.Stable peace and an unimpeded transport corridor to Middle Eastern energy resources are undoubtedly important for China. On the other hand, Beijing views these issues as significant levers of influence over Washington, with the aim of protecting its own key strategic interests, which lie not in the Middle East but in Taiwan.However, there have been no noticeable changes in the US position on this matter. And this does not entirely satisfy China, particularly regarding Washington’s readiness to sell arms to Taiwan and provide military support should China attempt to resolve the issue of the island by military means. And this is despite Xi’s warning that ‘missteps’ or an incorrect resolution of this issue by Washington could lead to ‘clashes or even conflict’ between the countries.Among the “most important international and regional issues” discussed, Ukraine was also mentioned. However, no specific details regarding the agreements reached have been reported. China’s readiness to play a more active role in ending the war will become clearer during Russian dictator Putin’s visit to Beijing, which is due to take place in the near future.The economic aspects of the relationship are no less important for the parties. As a result of last year’s tariff manoeuvring by Trump and Beijing’s retaliatory trade blackmail, the parties reached temporary compromise agreements which, however, do not appear ideal for either of them.The US insists on expanded access to the Chinese market and the lifting of restrictions on the export of rare-earth minerals. The Chinese are demanding the lifting of restrictions on access to new technologies, particularly in the fields of artificial intelligence and microchips, the abolition of protective tariffs, and an end to politically motivated bans on investment in American companies.According to Trump and members of his administration, significant progress was made during the meetings: Beijing expressed its readiness to increase imports of US agricultural products, purchase American oil and 200 Boeing aircraft, and establish a bilateral ‘Trade Council’.Xi also assessed the results positively, albeit in very general terms. He stated that following the visit, Beijing’s doors “to the outside world will open even wider”, and “American companies will have even better prospects in China”.However, the real significance of the economic agreements will only become apparent in due course.Both sides confirmed their interest in extending the one-year ‘trade truce’, which expires in October. At the same time, no firm public commitments were made on this matter. Statements from representatives of Trump’s cabinet on this matter included phrases such as “if this continues to work well for both countries”.

As evidenced by US President Donald Trump’s latest statements, the actual outcomes of the American leader’s visit to China fall significantly short of the glowing assessments he made in his press statements.

No winners: how Iran reduced Trump’s visit to China to yet another round of political and economic bargaining

The US Senate has confirmed Kevin Warsh as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) – the US central bank, which has been widely regarded as the world’s most influential central bank for nearly a century.He is due to take up the post on May 15. We can expect the Fed to maintain its measured policy and resist the extravagant whims of US President Donald Trump.Warsh worked at the Fed from 2006 to 2011. In other words, he was there during the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007–2008 and the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 that it triggered. At that time, the Fed, under the chairmanship of Ben Bernanke, acted with the utmost professionalism and responsibility to overcome both crises. Moreover, the Fed directly assisted European banks, saving many of them from a loss of liquidity and potential bankruptcy by providing hundreds of billions of dollars in long-term, low-cost loans. The Federal Open Market Committee, of which Warsh was a member, successfully resolved the most dangerous financial and economic crisis of the 21st century.Warsh also has experience in the business sector – he served as an executive director in the mergers and acquisitions department of the investment bank Morgan Stanley. Warsh is married to Jane Lauder – the daughter of billionaire Ronald Lauder, who is a friend of US President Trump.The main intrigue lies in the fact that, as Chair of the Fed, Warsh will have to face two problems requiring opposing courses of action: inflation, which requires a high Fed rate to combat, and President Trump’s persistent demands to lower the key rate to stimulate economic growth.Based on Warsh’s voting record during his time at the Fed between 2006 and 2011 and his public rhetoric on monetary policy, one should not expect the new Fed chair to unquestioningly follow Trump’s wishes. It can be assumed that Warsh’s approach will not differ greatly from the modus operandi of his predecessor, Jerome Powell – a focus on containing inflation and reducing inflationary risks, with an emphasis on very cautious and gradual cuts to the Fed rate, and a readiness to respond swiftly with rate hikes to rising inflationary risks. Although Warsh has recently adjusted his rhetoric slightly, this may be a tactical move to gain the support of Trump-aligned senators.Inflation in the US has accelerated noticeably recently. In April, it reached its highest level since May 2023 (4.1%), standing at 3.8% against the Fed’s long-term target of 2%. The main factor is the rise in global energy prices due to the war in Iran. Moreover, additional conditions for sustained high inflation have been identified: according to data from the US Bureau of Labour Statistics published on 13 May, the producer price index rose significantly in April to 4.3% year-on-year, compared with 3.4% in March – again, primarily due to rising fuel costs resulting from the war in the Persian Gulf. Rising US producer prices are likely to feed through to consumer prices in the near future.The Fed’s key interest rate has stood at 3.75% since last December. For the time being, inflation is significantly higher than the Fed’s long-term target. There are no signs of inflation easing; on the contrary, a further acceleration in price growth is possible. Therefore, a cut in the Fed rate is unlikely. At the same time, the US labour market is doing well – with an increase of 115,000 jobs according to April data. This is important given that the second part of the Fed’s mandate is to support employment. In other words, there is no need to cut rates on this front.Consequently, the Fed has no reason to make the kind of rate move that Trump desires, as the jobs data is quite positive and fuel costs continue to drive up consumer prices; therefore, the prospect of a rate cut is objectively unlikely.There is another possible argument in favour of the new Fed chair’s relatively hawkish stance: people’s economic behaviour is largely determined by their experiences during their formative years.Ulrika Malmendir, Professor of Economics and Finance at the University of California, Berkeley, explained in a study published on the website of the US National Bureau of Economic Research where the ‘hawks’ – that is, supporters of the Fed’s tight monetary policy – and the ‘doves’, i.e. advocates of soft monetary policy.Malmendier and her co-authors analysed 7,350 voting records from members of the Federal Open Market Committee regarding interest rates, based on the outcomes of 659 Committee meetings between 1951 and 2014, as well as data on each of the voting participants at the meetings. It turned out that Committee members who grew up during a period of high inflation and were more frequently exposed to rising prices tended to favour tighter measures (‘hawks’), prioritising the fight against inflation and voting to raise the key interest rate. Meanwhile, the ‘doves’ were those who had not experienced rising prices but had seen unemployment, and they advocated for a loosening of monetary policy in favour of economic growth and a reduction in unemployment; the issue of inflation was not a priority for the ‘doves’.The new Fed Chair, Warsh, was born in 1970, meaning he came of age in the 1980s, at the start of which inflation was in double digits (12–13%), and he surely remembers well the problems that high inflation caused for the US economy and population.The next Fed meeting, at which the interest rate will be discussed, will take place on 16–17 June. If the Iranian crisis does not end – and there is little prospect of that – the rate is unlikely to fall. On the contrary, we should not rule out a surprise for Trump in the form of ‘hawkish rhetoric’ – a promise to raise rates should inflationary risks persist or intensify. All the more so as the stock and commodity markets are ‘overheated’ and it would be desirable to ‘cool them down’ somewhat, so that the stock market bubble does not burst with a bang and cause panic. One of the tools for such ‘cooling’ could be a rate hike, or at least a promise to do so.There is little time left before we see how Warsh will act. At the same time, it should be noted that the US president has virtually no legally sound grounds to dismiss the Fed chair.

The US Senate has confirmed Kevin Warsh as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) – the US central bank, which has been widely regarded as the world’s most influential central bank for nearly a century.

He is due to take up the post on May 15. We can expect the Fed to maintain its measured policy and resist the extravagant whims of US President Donald Trump.

Vyacheslav BUTKO 

Trump wants cheaper money. Why the new Federal Reserve Chair may say ‘no’

Over the past two months, the world has lost around 1 billion barrels of oil, and it will take time for energy markets to stabilise, even if supplies are restored. This was stated on 10 May by Amin Nasser, CEO of Saudi Aramco.“Restoring supply routes is not the same as normalising a market that has been deprived of approximately one billion barrels of oil,” said the head of Saudi Arabia’s state-owned oil company, adding that years of underinvestment in the oil production sector have exacerbated the already considerable strain on global oil reserves.It is estimated that underinvestment in the global oil industry amounted to $2–3 trillion due to a number of reasons, such as: the fall in oil prices in 2014–2016, shareholders withdrawing large dividends from oil companies instead of reinvesting profits, an increased focus on the environmental ‘agenda’. As a result, the global oil production sector lacks spare capacity to replace volumes lost due to political and military risks.The current situation surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and chronic underinvestment in the oil industry over the past 10 years have triggered a restructuring of the global energy market. The Middle East is losing its status as a safe region for Western oil capital. Major Western oil companies are freezing new long-term projects in the Persian Gulf due to logistical and military risks, which is entirely logical from their perspective.Local state-owned companies in the Middle East will continue to invest, and Asian players may attempt to fill the gap left by the shortage of foreign capital. China is likely prepared to take risks to ensure its own energy security, as well as to forge political and economic ties with countries in the Middle East. However, they will not be able to replace Western companies due to a lack of capital and less-than-state-of-the-art technologyIt is estimated that by 2030, $4.5–5 trillion will need to be invested to meet global oil demand. The main flow of investment capital will shift to the Western Hemisphere and regions with lower geopolitical and military risks. The main beneficiaries will be US shale oil producers (in the immediate future – within a few months) and the US deepwater shelf (in the relatively near future – within a few quarters). Projects in Argentina, Brazil, Guyana, Namibia and Suriname will also become attractive to investors. However, implementation will take time, and the new production volumes will not offset the production from the Middle East, which has been lost for the long term.It appears that a period of persistently high prices has begun due to the oil shortage and investment challenges. The global market has lost its cheap Middle Eastern ‘safety cushion’. New projects in South and North America and Africa have higher production costs, which automatically raises the break-even point for investment returns. And, consequently, increases the price of the raw material. In addition to this, oil prices will now remain at a high level due to the risk premium built into them for an even greater reduction in supplies from the Middle East, should the Bab el-Mandeb Strait be blocked as well as the Strait of Hormuz. Among other things, high oil prices support Russia’s ability to finance the war in Ukraine and worsen the state of the European economy, reducing the EU’s capacity to support Ukraine.During the 2020–2021 coronavirus pandemic, the logistics crisis became a major driver of inflation, accounting for a significant portion of the overall rise in consumer prices. It all began with the sudden closure of ports, which created a physical shortage of goods. The cost of sea freight soared: the price of shipping a container rose from 2,500–3,000 to 15,000 dollars. Businesses operating on a ‘just-in-time’ model (a production and logistics management model where raw materials and components arrive at the factory exactly when they are needed, and in the required quantities, allowing for significant savings on stock and staff), found themselves unprepared for the disruption to supply chains and were forced to pass on the increased transport costs to the end consumer. The rise in fuel costs due to shortages will likewise be factored into the retail prices of goods and services.The Global Supply Chain Stress Index has been rising rapidly since the start of the war in Iran (this index, developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, is a key indicator of tension in international manufacturing and shipping markets).It is heading towards a situation where a wave of inflation will sweep across the world. But with a certain delay, as transport and logistics costs – a large proportion of which is accounted for by fuel costs – are passed on to retail prices gradually. This nature of price transmission means that transport costs will continue to put pressure on prices and the economy even after de-escalation in the largest oil-producing region (it is not yet known when this will be achieved).These issues fully apply to Ukraine as well, as a country that is almost entirely dependent on fuel imports for transport. The first wave of consequences was observed in March and April – the renegotiation of contracts between manufacturers and retail chains regarding prices. The second wave will be a rise in retail prices, which is expected in May–June (from July, consumer inflation should slow down thanks to the new harvest, but the overall price level will remain higher than it is now).Given that the crisis surrounding Iran continues and there is no end in sight, we can expect consistently high global fuel prices. On a global economic scale, the only factor capable of breaking this trend remains a global recession and a fall in aggregate demand due to high fuel prices. This scenario, if it materialises, will have a negative impact on Ukraine’s economy, which is very closely integrated into the global economy and heavily dependent on its state. According to international trade theory, the Ukrainian economy is classified as a ‘small open’ economy, i.e. one that actively participates in international trade (exports and imports), but is too small to influence global prices.On the other hand, a global economic recession, should it occur, could severely curtail Russia’s financial capacity to continue the war against Ukraine – due to a fall in demand for oil and a drop in oil prices, as revenues from the export of oil and petroleum products remain a crucial source of budget revenue for Russia.

Over the past two months, the world has lost around 1 billion barrels of oil, and it will take time for energy markets to stabilise, even if supplies are restored. This was stated on 10 May by Amin Nasser, CEO of Saudi Aramco.

The world is entering a period of high oil prices: what risks and opportunities does this present for Ukraine?

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsThe new Hungarian government, led by Péter Magyar, had barely taken office when the country’s policy began to shift. For Ukraine, this is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. A €90 billion reparations loan has been unblocked, the 20th package of EU sanctions has been approved, and the illegally seized funds of Oschadbank have been returned. Kyiv and Brussels have begun active consultations on the start of accession negotiations.However, on the issue of negotiations, Magyar has taken a hard line – stating that he is prepared to support their commencement only on condition that the rights of the Hungarian minority are expanded. Unfortunately, this is not about European standards, nor about expectations regarding the resolution of all issues during the accession negotiations. Mádár’s demands largely echo the list of 11 requirements that former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán put forward to Kyiv in 2024. These relate in particular to education in the Hungarian language, political representation, and so on.Many analysts had warned that Magyar’s policies might contain elements unpalatable to Kyiv and Brussels. However, few expected this to happen so quickly and on such a sensitive issue. All the more so as the discrepancies between Budapest’s policies and the European mainstream were one of the reasons for the blocking of significant funds for Hungary, which the new Prime Minister is seeking to obtain.Brussels is hoping for Orbán’s pragmatism, whilst at the same time planning to put pressure on the new Hungarian government to resolve the Ukrainian issue as quickly as possible. The European Commission’s ‘cards’ are undoubtedly very strong. The possibility of unblocking €10.4 billion from the EU’s post-COVID fund is currently under discussion. The European Commission is prepared to discuss only the grant portion, which amounts to €6.5 billion. The Hungarians, however, are seeking to secure €3.9 billion in preferential loans as well. For Budapest, this is important not only from a financial but also from a political point of view.Positive changes have taken place in relations with Bratislava. Following the resumption of operations on the Druzhba oil pipeline and the loss of a key political ally on the pro-Russian flank, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has lifted the block on all contentious issues. His meeting with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Yerevan on 4 May, during which Fico declared his support for Ukraine’s EU membership, cemented this positive trend.On the other hand, the victory of Rumen Radev, who is considered a pro-Russian politician, in the parliamentary elections in Bulgaria on 19 April and his appointment as Prime Minister points to the possible emergence of a new risk factor for both Ukraine and Brussels. This is suggested by Radev’s vague statements regarding the ownership of Crimea and the status of Russian dictator Putin as an aggressor, the advisability of continuing to purchase energy resources from Russia, and his reluctance to supply weapons to Ukraine, which, in his view, prolongs the war.At the same time, in Bulgaria itself, people are pinning their hopes on Radev’s pragmatism, comparing him to Fico rather than Orbán. This is justified not only by his character traits, which he has repeatedly demonstrated during his nine-year presidency, but also by the mood among the Bulgarian population. According to a poll conducted by Alpha Research at the start of the year, 56% of Bulgarians see Europe as a strategic partner, and only 19% see Russia as such.

The new Hungarian government, led by Péter Magyar, had barely taken office when the country’s policy began to shift. For Ukraine, this is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. A €90 billion reparations loan has been unblocked, the 20th package of EU sanctions has been approved, and the illegally seized funds of Oschadbank have been returned. Kyiv and Brussels have begun active consultations on the start of accession negotiations.

The EU after Orbán: what has changed for Ukraine

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsThe latest summit of the European Political Community (EPC) is taking place in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia. Since October 2022, this initiative has brought together European leaders – excluding Russia and Belarus – to discuss European security issues and demonstrate Russia’s international isolation. This is the first time the meeting has taken place in a country hosting a legally established Russian military base. A country which, despite tense relations with Russia and the organisations created by Moscow to control the post-Soviet space, is officially a member of the CSTO, the Eurasian Economic Union and the CIS.This is yet another signal to Moscow that its aggressive imperial policy is not accepted, in this case from the capital of its former loyal ally.Coinciding with the EaP summit in Yerevan, the first Armenia-EU bilateral summit is also taking place, attended by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa. On the agenda is the development of cooperation in the context of the geopolitical pivot towards the EU announced by Yerevan last year, the aim of which is to secure EU membership in the long term.The trend towards Armenia’s distancing from Moscow is evident, although it is not always linear, with a certain level of pragmatic economic ties being maintained. This is evidenced by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s visit to Moscow in April and his meeting with Putin. In response to the latter’s remark that membership of the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) are incompatible, Pashinyan noted that at this stage he sees no contradiction. And when the time comes to make a choice – the Armenian people will make it.It cannot be said that Moscow is taking Yerevan’s policy shift in its stride. There are threats of price hikes for Russian energy resources and tariffs on Armenian exports. Hybrid methods of influence are being actively employed – ranging from information campaigns on Telegram claiming that holding the two aforementioned summits would mark a point of no return in relations with Russia, to hacker threats.Armenia remains dependent on Russian energy resources, purchasing Russian gas at preferential rates. Around 25% of its exports go to Russia. Nevertheless, with the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow has lost its most significant lever of influence over Yerevan.The prospects for the development of Armenia’s relations with the EU also remain unclear for the time being. The timeline for granting candidate status is undefined. At the same time, the West’s interest in separating the South Caucasus from Russia speaks in favour of the country’s European orientation.As for Armenia’s resolve on the path to the EU, much will depend on the upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for June. According to the International Republican Institute (IRI), the approval rating of the current Prime Minister and his political party stood at 24% in March.However, Armenia’s pro-European policy is not merely a decision of the elite. It is now actively supported by the Armenian people as well. According to IRI research from February 2026, 72% of respondents fully or partially support Armenia’s EU membership, which is the highest figure recorded since monitoring on this issue began. The capital of Armenia, Yerevan, is hosting the latest summit of the European Political Community (EPC). Since October 2022, this initiative has brought together European leaders, excluding Russia and Belarus, to discuss European security issues and demonstrate Russia’s international isolation. This is the first time the meeting has taken place in a country on whose territory a Russian military base is legally present. In a country which, despite tense relations with Russia and the organisations created by Moscow to control the post-Soviet space, is officially a member of the Organisation of the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This is yet another signal to Moscow that its aggressive imperial policy is not accepted, in this case from the capital of its former loyal ally.

The latest summit of the European Political Community (EPC) is taking place in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia. Since October 2022, this initiative has brought together European leaders – excluding Russia and Belarus – to discuss European security issues and demonstrate Russia’s international isolation. This is the first time the meeting has taken place in a country hosting a legally established Russian military base. A country which, despite tense relations with Russia and the organisations created by Moscow to control the post-Soviet space, is officially a member of the CSTO, the Eurasian Economic Union and the CIS.

The South Caucasus’s geopolitical shift towards the West is intensifying

“We are tired. The world needs to pay more attention to Ukraine”: How the Kyiv Security Forum managed to bring Prince Harry, NATO and EU leaders to the capital”

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsAccording to a recently published poll by Odoxa, Jordan Bardella, leader of the far-right ‘National Rally’ (Le Pen’s party), could come to power in the next French presidential election in spring 2027. This means that one of the key member states, on whose support and influence we have traditionally relied in recent years, could radically change its role and become one of our main adversaries, both in terms of providing assistance in the war against Russia and on the path to our country’s membership of the EU and NATO.The threat from the far right is not new to France. But previously, at critical moments, it was possible to circumvent it by the traditional alignment of all key political forces, led by the centrists, against Le Pen’s party. The difference today is that the far-left leader of ‘Unbowed France’, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, could come second after Bardella, and it will be difficult for him to act as a unifying force. Politico calls this ‘a nightmare scenario for Brussels in the French elections’. However, not just for Brussels.So far, the gap in the polls does not look quite so dramatic. In the first round, the conservative candidate, former Prime Minister Édouard Philippe, trails Mélenchon by 4% (12% to 16%). Philippe can expect a similar defeat in the second round against Bardella (48% to 52%). However, if Bardella and Mélenchon face off in the second round, the far-right’s lead will be clear (in November, Odoxa put the odds at 74% to 26%).On the far-right of the political spectrum, Bardella stands out favourably from the party’s previous leaders, including Marine Le Pen herself. He is considered a pragmatist, less ideologically tied to the party’s old Eurosceptic tenets. Taking public sentiment into account, he has moved away from slogans calling for an exit from the eurozone or the EU along the lines of the British Brexit, which reduced Marine Le Pen’s chances of winning during previous campaigns. As political commentators point out, Bardella’s economic priorities are closer to traditional right-wing conservative ones.The difference in views between Bardella and Le Pen, who adheres to more traditional Eurosceptic values, is seen as one of the signs of a split within the ranks of the ‘National Rally’. At the same time, such flexibility in the party’s principles may also serve as a deliberate tool for expanding the party’s electoral support.Following Russia’s large-scale invasion in 2022, the party’s official stance on Putin also became more flexible. Under pressure from public support for Ukraine, former sympathies towards the Russian dictator were erased from the party’s public image. Whilst condemning certain aspects of Russian aggression, the National Rally avoids open confrontation with the Kremlin. It has repeatedly opposed certain military aid packages for Ukraine and the expansion of sanctions against Russia, both in the European Parliament and during votes in the French National Assembly. Bardella himself has emphasised that he does not object to providing Ukraine with defence aid, but does not support sending French troops to Ukraine or supplying our country with long-range weaponry. According to the far-right leader, he will not allow “Russian imperialism to swallow up an ally such as Ukraine”. At the same time, he seeks to avoid escalation with Russia.More threatening to Ukraine’s interests is Bardella’s stance on the country’s membership of the EU and NATO. He is categorically opposed to both. As for the EU – given the potential competition for markets and, evidently, for funds – and as for NATO – due to what he believes will be a deterioration in relations with Russia and an escalation of the war. These same reasons also underpin his opposition to tightening sanctions against Putin’s regime.At the same time, it is worth taking into account certain personal nuances of the young leader of the far-right. It cannot be ruled out that his ambition for leadership not only on the national but also on the European stage will contribute to a gradual shift in his views towards the European mainstream. The example of Giorgia Meloni may prove tempting for this young and ambitious politician.

According to a recently published poll by Odoxa, Jordan Bardella, leader of the far-right ‘National Rally’ (Le Pen’s party), could come to power in the next French presidential election in spring 2027. This means that one of the key member states, on whose support and influence we have traditionally relied in recent years, could radically change its role and become one of our main adversaries, both in terms of providing assistance in the war against Russia and on the path to our country’s membership of the EU and NATO.

Will the French political establishment’s instinct for self-preservation kick in, and what might the consequences be for Ukraine?

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsAccording to the American media outlet Politico and the German magazine Der Spiegel, during a closed-door meeting of NATO political directors, Washington warned its allies of a gradual reduction in US military capabilities allocated to NATO operations.This concerns not only troop reductions but also strategic bombers, fighter jets, aircraft carriers, reconnaissance drones, submarines and warships. Furthermore, it is anticipated that NATO military commanders will no longer be able to issue orders to US forces in Europe, meaning they will be unable to deploy them in the event of a Russian attack. Europeans have until June to put forward proposals for replacing these assets with their own resources or procuring the necessary US equipment.There is nothing fundamentally new in this. However, it seems that the Europeans did not expect the US to withdraw on such a scale.These statements can be seen as part of a continuing trend of pressure from Washington on Europe to stimulate its efforts to ensure its own defence. But this time it concerns not only American military units, but also assets that Europe does not possess. In the view of the average person, at least some of these should also be used to underpin the US ‘nuclear umbrella’ for Europe. However, Washington emphasises that nuclear commitments remain in force, and the reduction applies only to conventional capabilities, which Europe could compensate for or acquire.It is interesting that all these changes are still justified by the US’s desire to focus on other regions, in particular the Western Hemisphere, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, reference is made to President Trump’s remarks following his meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, in which he stated that he had no intention of sending American troops ‘9,500 miles’ to defend Taiwan. Trump has repeatedly emphasised his indifference regarding the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, in the spirit of ‘there is a great and beautiful ocean between us’, so let Europe, which has an interest in this, deal with the issue.Of course, bringing Cuba under control – a goal neither Trump nor Rubio are willing to abandon – is a far more achievable objective for a nuclear superpower, comparable to a successful operation in Venezuela. Moreover, it could have a positive impact on the mid-term elections to the US Congress. However, does such a stance align with Washington’s claims to democracy and as the world’s number one military power?Fortunately, the cuts do not yet affect all American assets. In particular, they do not concern satellite communications and intelligence, or airspace surveillance capabilities. However, even in this scenario, it will pose a serious problem for Europeans.Undoubtedly, Ukraine, with its practical experience of waging modern warfare and its military-technical achievements, could partially offset the losses caused by the Americans’ withdrawal. However, Washington’s blocking of Ukraine’s NATO membership could prove a serious obstacle here. And the EU, which is more open to Ukraine’s integration, does not yet play a decisive role in ensuring Europe’s defence.A reduction in the US conventional presence on the European continent will not help to provide security guarantees for Ukraine itself, without which an end to the war with Russia is unlikely, and a ceasefire – unstable.

According to the American media outlet Politico and the German magazine Der Spiegel, during a closed-door meeting of NATO political directors, Washington warned its allies of a gradual reduction in US military capabilities allocated to NATO operations.