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Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsThe military operation by the United States and Israel against Iran is increasingly showing signs of dragging on. While its duration was initially expected to be a matter of days, then weeks, observers are now referring to internal Pentagon estimates that suggest it could last for months. Interim elections to the US Congress are effectively becoming the political horizon for this campaign. At the same time, the question arises: will Washington be able to continue to fully control the dynamics of the conflict?At the same time, the strategic objectives of the operation are becoming increasingly blurred. Initially, the goal was to eliminate Iran's nuclear and missile programmes and physically remove key political and military leaders of the regime. Now, however, a broader formula is increasingly being heard: the removal of the Ayatollahs' religious regime from power. However, the key moment for the implementation of such a scenario has probably been lost. The large-scale anti-government protests in Iran did not receive the external support that their participants had hoped for. Instead, Washington has begun a new round of negotiations with the Iranian leadership. In these circumstances, the opposition, weakened and fragmented, is unlikely to be ready for a new attempt at large-scale political action. Cooperation with Kurdish armed groups could be a possible tool for putting pressure on Tehran. However, even if a limited ground operation involving Kurdish forces were to be carried out, it would only result in a change of control over individual provinces. This is unlikely to lead to the fall of the central authority of the ayatollahs in Tehran.Calculations about an internal split in the regime's security forces also proved to be wrong. US President Donald Trump's calls for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to side with the opposition have no real basis. Moreover, some of the moderate Iranian politicians on whom Washington had been counting were killed in Israeli strikes on the government quarter, along with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Others, such as current President Masoud Pezeshkian, have no real influence on the key power structures of the state. It was also telling that Pezeshkian's promises to refrain from strikes on Arab countries were demonstratively ignored by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.At the same time, the initial military results of the campaign should not be underestimated. The US and Israel have managed to destroy a significant part of Iran's air defence systems, seriously weaken its navy, strike its missile infrastructure and partially paralyse the export capabilities of its oil sector. However, even under these conditions, it is extremely difficult to predict when the operation will end. Moreover, President Trump no longer rules out the possibility of a limited ground operation – for example, to seize enriched uranium stocks.The energy component is becoming one of the key implications of the conflict. Oil and gas prices are rising rapidly. The Strait of Hormuz remains formally open, but has effectively ceased to be used due to constant shelling. The US promises to guarantee the safety of shipping have not yet been fulfilled. China's calls for Tehran to resume transit, even if they have some impact, are unlikely to change the situation quickly.Additional pressure on global energy markets is being created by attacks on the oil and gas infrastructure of other countries in the region. Some facilities have been damaged, while others have been temporarily shut down for safety reasons.For Ukraine, the war around Iran has a double effect. On the one hand, the weakening of Tehran, Russia's key military and technological partner, has an obvious positive impact. The destruction of part of the missile and drone production facilities, as well as stocks of Shahed-type drones, directly affects Moscow's ability to continue the war against Ukraine.On the other hand, the conflict poses serious risks. First and foremost, there is a sharp rise in global energy prices, which directly increases Russian budget revenues and gives the Kremlin additional resources to rebuild its military potential. The shortage of air defence systems is also becoming a separate problem. Kyiv is already talking officially about a possible shortage of missiles for Patriot systems, and there is no quick solution to this problem in sight.Ukraine's cooperation with the US and Arab states in countering Iranian drones could strengthen our country's international image and increase interest in the Ukrainian experience. However, this does not solve the key problem – protection against Russian ballistic missiles.At the same time, the conflict complicates the prospects for peace talks with Russia. Even Washington's demonstrative unwillingness to exacerbate relations with Moscow over its intelligence support for Iran is unlikely to change the Kremlin's position.Europe is also among the main victims of the war in the Middle East. Rising energy prices and the risk of new migration flows are putting significant political pressure on European governments. This complicates the maintenance of transatlantic unity, especially against the backdrop of President Trump's harsh criticism of certain European allies who have expressed doubts about the advisability of an offensive operation against Iran.In these circumstances, it is critically important for Ukraine not only to ensure uninterrupted supplies of air defence systems, but also to seek to expand its long-range capabilities. Under current conditions, the destruction of the Russian military-industrial complex's production capabilities is becoming one of the key tools for deterring aggression – not only for Ukraine, but also for the security of Europe as a whole.

The military operation by the United States and Israel against Iran is increasingly showing signs of dragging on. While its duration was initially expected to be a matter of days, then weeks, observers are now referring to internal Pentagon estimates that suggest it could last for months. Interim elections to the US Congress are effectively becoming the political horizon for this campaign. At the same time, the question arises: will Washington be able to continue to fully control the dynamics of the conflict?

War in Iran: signs of a protracted operation and new geopolitical risks

Kyiv Security Forum Analytics• &nbsp; &nbsp;Hungary is entering a decisive phase of political struggle. Parliamentary elections will be held on 12 April, and for the first time in many years, there is a real prospect that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has ruled the country since 2010, will lose power.• &nbsp; &nbsp;For the first time, the opposition has a significant lead over the ruling party. According to a poll by Zavecz Research (22–28 February) among voters who have made up their minds, 50% support the Tisza party and 38% support Fidesz. Among all voters, the figures are 38% against 32%. About 20% are still uncertain.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The new leader in Hungarian politics is Péter Magyar, a former ally of Orbán. He heads the Tisza party and is campaigning under the slogans of fighting corruption, unblocking EU funds and returning Hungary to the European mainstream.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The elections are effectively turning into a referendum on the geopolitical course: continued confrontation with the EU and semi-isolation, or a return to democratic Europe and strengthening the country's role in the EU and NATO.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The economic situation is weakening the government's position: GDP growth is less than 1%, the budget deficit is over 4%, industrial production is falling and prices are rising. More than €19 billion in EU funds remain blocked due to problems with the rule of law and corruption.• &nbsp; &nbsp;Orbán has made conflict with Brussels and Kyiv part of his political strategy. His government is blocking new sanctions against Russia, slowing down negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU and opposing a large financial aid package for Ukraine.• &nbsp; &nbsp;Anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become one of the key themes of Fidesz's election campaign. Orbán is spreading narratives about an alleged ‘Ukrainian threat’ to Hungary's energy system and sharply criticising Kyiv, while barely reacting to Moscow's actions.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The detention of Ukrainian cash collectors by Hungarian law enforcement agencies caused a scandal. This involved the stopping and detention of cash collection vehicles belonging to a Ukrainian bank during a regular currency transport operation. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs rightly called these actions a de facto taking of people hostage. The incident is a telling example of how even forceful and diplomatic mechanisms are used by Budapest to exert political pressure on Ukraine.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The stance of the opposition towards Ukraine is not clear-cut. The Tisza party did not support the aid package for Ukraine in the European Parliament, and Magyar himself spoke out against Ukraine's accelerated accession to the EU and the transfer of weapons.• &nbsp; &nbsp;At the same time, the arrival of the new government will almost certainly mean an end to the demonstrative pro-Russian policy and the systematic blocking of EU decisions on Ukraine.• &nbsp; &nbsp;A poll conducted by the Tisza party showed that about 60% of Hungarians support Ukraine's accession to the EU, which indicates that anti-Ukrainian rhetoric is largely a product of political propaganda.• &nbsp; &nbsp;Even if the opposition wins, Hungary will not automatically become an ally of Ukraine, but it may cease to be the main blocker of European policy towards Kyiv.

Hungary is entering a decisive phase of political struggle. Parliamentary elections will be held on 12 April, and for the first time in many years, there is a real prospect that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has ruled the country since 2010, will lose power. For the first time, the opposition has a significant lead over the ruling party. 

What should we know about the situation in Hungary?

Gas is becoming just as crucial a factor in the war as oil. The damage to QatarEnergy’s infrastructure and the suspension of part of its production have highlighted the vulnerability of the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) market. Qatar accounts for around 20% of global LNG supplies, and there is virtually no spare capacity to quickly make up for these volumes. This is of particular concern for Europe, as after 2022 its energy balance will rely heavily on LNG imports.The scope for quickly replacing Middle Eastern gas is limited. The US remains the largest alternative supplier, but its export infrastructure is already operating at near-capacity. Even the planned increase in exports of around 15 million tonnes per year would not be enough to offset Qatari volumes, which amount to around 80 million tonnes annually.Norway is also operating at the limits of its production capacity. This means that in the event of a protracted crisis, the market will face not only rising prices but also the risk of a physical gas shortage.In this situation, Russia gains an additional lever of pressure over the European market. Russia is already signalling the possibility of halting gas supplies to the EU ahead of the deadlines set by Brussels. Putin has stated outright that rising prices in Europe are linked to competition for more solvent markets. Meanwhile, American LNG will go where the price is higher – that is, to Asia. The Russian leader has stated that an accelerated reorientation of exports towards alternative destinations is being worked on, although for now this looks more like tactical blackmail. However, against the backdrop of possible supply disruptions from the Persian Gulf, this strengthens Russia’s negotiating position in both Europe and Asia.Be that as it may, Russia stands to gain the most from a halt to Qatari gas supplies. And this benefit is not limited to a temporary rise in prices (though we do not know how temporary this rise will be – Iran, it seems, is prepared to block the Strait of Hormuz for a long time). The main benefit for Russia is that it will now be much more difficult to block supplies of Russian LNG. This is because consumers – primarily Asian countries – will realise that even if the Strait of Hormuz is unblocked in the near future, it could be blocked again at any moment, and they must always have a ‘Plan B’ in place for such an eventuality.At the same time, Europe will realise that due to the ‘Asian premium’ – the ability and willingness of Asian countries to pay a higher price – American gas will go not to Europe, but to Asia. And it is by no means out of the question that Europe will be tempted to return to Russian gas. Initially, this would be temporary. But, as the saying goes, ‘nothing is more permanent than the temporary’.The key question for the coming weeks is the extent to which regional players will be drawn in. If the conflict remains within its current boundaries and is limited to an exchange of blows between Iran, Israel and their allies, it will enter a phase of protracted confrontation involving economic pressure and periodic strikes on infrastructure.But if hostilities affect major energy facilities in the Gulf states or a de facto complete and strict blockade of the Strait of Hormuz takes place (formally, it has not been closed, but traffic has been drastically reduced and insurance costs have soared), the conflict will quickly escalate into a global energy crisis with corresponding consequences for the world economy.Vyacheslav ButkoEconomic Adviser to the Kyiv Security Forum

Gas is becoming just as crucial a factor in the war as oil. The damage to QatarEnergy’s infrastructure and the suspension of part of its production have highlighted the vulnerability of the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) market. Qatar accounts for around 20% of global LNG supplies, and there is virtually no spare capacity to quickly make up for these volumes. This is of particular concern for Europe, as after 2022 its energy balance will rely heavily on LNG imports.

Vyacheslav BUTKO 

On the impact of the war in the Middle East on the global gas market

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsThe war in Iran has posed a serious challenge for many countries around the world: loss of investment, rising energy prices, economic problems and security risks.China is no exception. As part of the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ between China and Iran, a 25-year, $400 billion agreement was signed in 2021 to invest in Iran’s energy, infrastructure and banking sectors, partly in exchange for discounts on oil exports to China. And this channel has been utilised very extensively by both sides. In 2025, Tehran exported over 80 per cent of its oil to China.China also receives a significant portion of its energy resources from other Middle Eastern countries, whose export potential is now in doubt, at least in the immediate future.It is difficult to say to what extent temporary energy supply issues are actually affecting China. After all, during the first two months of this year, Beijing imported 15.8 per cent more oil compared to the same period last year. As was the case throughout 2025, China has been replenishing its strategic reserves to protect against geopolitical risks.At the same time, Beijing is holding talks with Tehran regarding the unimpeded passage of Chinese goods through the Strait of Hormuz. It is not yet clear whether final agreements have been reached between the parties. However, other countries have already begun to use the Chinese factor to enhance security when transiting the strait. By identifying their vessels, cargo and crews as Chinese, they seek to avoid coming under fire from the IRGC. Nevertheless, such ‘know-how’ is unlikely to function reliably and for the long term without official support from Beijing.The Middle East is important to Beijing in terms of exports of goods and technology, particularly following the deterioration of trade relations with the US. China’s exports to this region in 2025 grew almost twice as fast as its exports to the rest of the world. China’s technological achievements in the field of renewable energy have attracted interest. The United Arab Emirates has become the fastest-growing market for Chinese car manufacturers. Demand for Chinese steel from Saudi Arabia and its neighbours has doubled.Chinese investment in the Middle East is also growing faster than anywhere else in the world. Chinese financial institutions have provided loans to oil refineries, liquefied natural gas (LNG) production facilities and seaports, and have financed the expansion of oil production, railway infrastructure, power grids, petrochemical plants, goods transport and so on.However, it cannot be said that the war in Iran has not brought China certain dividends, especially if one thinks strategically rather than in terms of financial gain.Official Beijing condemned the operation against Iran from the very outset and began calling for an end to the war. The reputation as a global pillar of stability and security is one of the ‘trump cards’ of China’s foreign policy. Through this unique form of ‘soft power’, it seeks to win over other countries, strengthen its geopolitical influence and improve its economic prospects. In many cases, this is an effective factor, particularly when compared to Washington’s unpredictability.Of course, Taiwan and Beijing’s policy of escalating the situation surrounding the island are an exception. However, Washington’s large-scale military action in Iran is, in this regard, not only a temptation for Beijing but also a serious deterrent.The rift between Moscow and Beijing, so desired by US President Donald Trump, has also been put on hold, at the very least, and in the event of a protracted war with Iran, it is called into question. After all, with the reduction in energy supplies from the Middle East, Russia is becoming even more attractive. Consequently, Moscow’s already excessive trade dependence on Beijing is intensifying. Unfortunately, this may also strengthen the strategic ties between the two capitals.Nor should China’s strategic ties with Iran be considered lost, at least until Islamists seize power in that country – a scenario that is not yet on the horizon. Given Beijing’s close ties with Middle Eastern countries, its unique opportunities for peacemaking in the region remain intact. This is particularly true against the backdrop of Washington’s increasingly controversial reputation.In theory, one could also predict an increase in Beijing’s global influence due to its ability to ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. False signals about a ‘Chinese footprint’ may well be replaced by official Chinese protection.Thus, a war in Iran will not destroy the ‘axis of evil’, but it could significantly alter the distribution of roles within it, and in a way that strengthens China.

The war in Iran has posed a serious challenge for many countries around the world: loss of investment, rising energy prices, economic problems and security risks. China is no exception. As part of the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ between China and Iran, a 25-year, $400 billion agreement was signed in 2021 to invest in Iran’s energy, infrastructure and banking sectors, partly in exchange for discounts on oil exports to China. And this channel has been utilised very extensively by both sides. In 2025, Tehran exported over 80 per cent of its oil to China.

China: a beneficiary or a victim?

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsUkraine has become one of the main targets of the Fidesz party’s election campaign. In this regard, we find ourselves in ‘good company’ – alongside the leadership of the European Union. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán regularly attacks European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, accusing Brussels of supporting Ukraine.Fidesz’s anti-Ukrainian rhetoric goes hand in hand with its anti-European campaign. And this is happening in a country that has received billions of euros in financial support from the EU for decades.The ruling party is trying to convince Hungarian society that the source of the country’s economic problems is Ukraine. Not the miscalculations of government economic policy, not the consequences of Russian aggression, not global energy shocks — but Ukraine itself.The rise in energy prices in Budapest is attributed to the suspension of the Druzhba oil pipeline, damaged by a Russian strike. However, the blame is shifted onto Kyiv — allegedly, Ukraine is not clearing up the aftermath of the attack quickly enough or is exaggerating its scale. To ‘confirm’ this version, a group of Hungarian ‘experts’ is being sent to Ukraine in a show of force — without consultation with Kyiv and with maximum media coverage. It is clear that this is not about expertise, but a propaganda stunt.At the same time, Orbán has not voiced a single word of criticism towards Russia. Some observers even suggest that the attack on the oil pipeline could have been part of a broader Russian-Hungarian information operation aimed at discrediting Ukraine.In this same context, one should also consider the detention in Hungary of two Oschadbank cash-in-transit vehicles carrying cash sent by the Austrian Raiffeisen Bank in accordance with the current agreement. The money will obviously be returned — but quietly and only after the elections. For now, however, this act, which has rightly been called ‘state banditry’ in Kyiv, is being used to create an image of alleged Ukrainian corruption. At the same time, Budapest’s propaganda reports prefer not to mention the fact that an Austrian bank was involved in the deal.Blocking negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU is another central element of Orbán’s policy. His arguments boil down to a simple slogan: Ukraine’s membership allegedly harms Hungary’s interests. Budapest ignores rational explanations that it is precisely the negotiations that should determine the terms of accession — after all, it is blocking them itself. In this logic, it is not Hungarian but Russian interests that are becoming increasingly apparent. Orbán’s recent statement about his desire to see Ukraine as a ‘buffer’ between Hungary and Russia is also telling.Russian influence is also evident in Budapest’s energy policy. Orbán is proposing to lift part of the EU’s energy sanctions against Moscow, is blocking the 20th package of sanctions, and is also blocking a €90 billion loan to Ukraine — despite the fact that Hungary had already agreed to this mechanism last year following a compromise with its partners. Now Budapest is effectively reneging on its own commitments — behaviour that Brussels considers unacceptable. But for the election campaign, it seems, any means are fair game.The European Commission is responding cautiously, trying to avoid accusations of interfering in the elections. Nevertheless, such accusations are still being levelled — without any basis. Fidesz needs them to mobilise the electorate against its main opponent — Péter Magyar, leader of the Tisa party, whom government propaganda portrays as a ‘puppet of Brussels’.Despite this, the European Union is hoping for political change. Opinion polls provide grounds for such expectations. In early March, a survey by the 21 Research Centre, commissioned by the publication 24.hu, showed that among decided voters, 53% support Péter Magyar and 39% support Viktor Orbán.However, regardless of the election results, the future of Ukrainian-Hungarian relations will require serious work. The Orbán government’s long-standing anti-Ukrainian campaign has significantly distorted the atmosphere between our nations. According to the Pew Research Center (July 2025), Hungarians perceive Ukraine as one of the main threats — 27%, second only to Russia (33%).This is one of the most alarming consequences of Budapest’s current policy.

Ukraine has become one of the main targets of the Fidesz party’s election campaign. In this regard, we find ourselves in ‘good company’ – alongside the leadership of the European Union. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán regularly attacks European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, accusing Brussels of supporting Ukraine.

Orbán against Ukraine: pre-election politics of fear

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsOn March 16, a meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council took place in Brussels, at which Ukraine and the escalation in the Middle East were the key topics.However, the true substance of this discussion was determined not by the agenda, but by the political context. There is growing concern that the Russian-Ukrainian war may take a back seat to the Iranian crisis, which is increasingly dominating Washington’s priorities. Added to this are signals from the US regarding a possible weakening of energy sanctions against Russia, calls for Europe to follow this course, as well as Donald Trump’s sharp rhetoric – ranging from demands to form a coalition to unblock the Strait of Hormuz to direct hints at a review of US commitments within NATO.In this context, Europe’s position has been articulated clearly and even demonstratively firmly. Ukraine remains the EU’s top security priority. There will be no ‘shift in focus’. The sanctions regime remains in place, and the strategic goal – a complete end to energy dependence on Russia – remains unchanged. The key message is simply put: if Europe wants an end to the war, Russia must receive fewer resources, not more. In this context, the fight against Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ will continue to play a special role.Regarding the Middle East, the EU recognises the risk of a large-scale regional escalation with direct consequences for the global economy – from trade routes to energy and food prices. However, Europe’s response does not involve military intervention, but rather deterrence and diplomacy: a call for a cessation of hostilities, a ceasefire and a return to negotiations.The only practical solution has been to step up the EU’s participation in the ASPIDES maritime defence operation in the Red Sea – as a means of safeguarding freedom of navigation. Crucially, however, Europe has refused to join the US military operation against Iran, particularly in the event of a forced opening of the Strait of Hormuz.The formula articulated by Kaja Kallas sums up the EU’s position: ‘this is not Europe’s war’. Washington’s military objectives remain unclear, and the risks are uncontrollable, including a potential global economic shock and even the threat of a food crisis.It is telling that key European states – Germany, the UK, Italy, Spain, Greece and Luxembourg – have publicly distanced themselves from any involvement in military escalation.In fact, Trump’s calls have been ignored. His pressure, including hints about NATO’s future, has not changed Europe’s position.Does this mean a crisis for the Alliance? Not yet. Europe has adopted a cautious, wait-and-see strategy: to minimise conflict with Washington, buy time and wait for political changes in the US.However, if the transatlantic rift deepens, the scenario of a transformation in the security architecture becomes realistic. In the long term, a narrower but more effective defence alliance of like-minded states could emerge – with Ukraine potentially participating fully.In conclusion, Europe has not only kept the focus on Ukraine, for the first time, but it has drawn such a clear line between its own interests and Washington’s new, more confrontational stance.

On March 16, a meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council took place in Brussels, at which Ukraine and the escalation in the Middle East were the key topics. However, the true substance of this discussion was determined not by the agenda, but by the political context. There is growing concern that the Russian-Ukrainian war may take a back seat to the Iranian crisis, which is increasingly dominating Washington’s priorities. Added to this are signals from the US regarding a possible weakening of energy sanctions against Russia, calls for Europe to follow this course, as well as Donald Trump’s sharp rhetoric – ranging from demands to form a coalition to unblock the Strait of Hormuz to direct hints at a review of US commitments within NATO.

Europe remains focused on Ukraine – and is distancing itself from Trump’s war

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsRecently, a controversial post on X by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk caused a stir in the Ukrainian and international media. He stated that Poland’s withdrawal from the European Union was no longer ‘hypothetical’. In his view, this is the aim of the parliamentary groups ‘Confederation Liberty and Independence’ (‘Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość’) and ‘Confederation of the Polish Crown’ (‘Konfederacja Korony Polskiej), as well as a significant proportion of politicians from the former ruling party ‘Law and Justice’ (‘Prawo i Sprawiedliwość’, PiS).Tusk included Russia, the American MAGA movement and European far-right radicals – symbolically represented by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán – among the external actors who, in his view, are spreading Eurosceptic narratives.However, the trigger for such strong warnings was not the radicals’ statements, but President Karol Nawrocki’s veto of a law on obtaining a preferential loan of €43.7 billion under the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence programme.These funds were to be used to modernise the Polish armed forces, in particular as part of Poland’s record defence budget for 2026 – 200 billion Polish złoty, which amounts to around 4.8% of the country’s GDP. Navrocki explained his decision by stating that borrowing through foreign banks is disadvantageous for Poland and that these needs should be met using domestic resources.Prime Minister Tusk considers this approach unrealistic. At the same time, the governing coalition does not have enough votes to override the presidential veto. Consequently, it remains unclear how the financial dilemma surrounding defence spending will be resolved.As for relations with Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán, who may lose power following the parliamentary elections, the Polish government likely has no grounds for excessive concern. However, accusations aimed at the MAGA movement – a political force linked to US President Donald Trump – may have certain consequences. Poland has traditionally relied on the United States for security matters – both regarding the American military presence and large-scale arms purchases.Anti-European sentiments do indeed exist in Poland, and they cannot be dismissed as marginal. According to various estimates, between 10 and 25 per cent of citizens may support the idea of leaving the EU. At the same time, this level of support does not yet appear critical. All the more so as Poland remains one of the biggest beneficiaries of European integration. Over twenty years of membership, it has received over €245 billion from the EU budget, whilst its contribution amounted to approximately €84 billion.However, Donald Tusk’s signals should not be ignored. The experience of the UK’s exit from the EU shows that an aggressive information – or rather disinformation – campaign, amplified by external actors, is sometimes capable of outweighing even the most convincing pragmatic arguments. We must also be prepared for the fact that in this existentially important debate, both sides may use not only bare facts to bolster their position, but also exaggerated concerns and warnings, or even blatant emotional scaremongering.

Recently, a controversial post on X by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk caused a stir in the Ukrainian and international media. He stated that Poland’s withdrawal from the European Union was no longer ‘hypothetical’. In his view, this is the aim of the parliamentary groups ‘Confederation Liberty and Independence’ (‘Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość’) and ‘Confederation of the Polish Crown’ (‘Konfederacja Korony Polskiej), as well as a significant proportion of politicians from the former ruling party ‘Law and Justice’ (‘Prawo i Sprawiedliwość’, PiS).

Will we witness PolExit?

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsThe EU summit on 19–20 March demonstrated that conflict continues within the European Union due to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán blocking key issues relating to Ukraine, including a €90 billion reparations loan.The overwhelming majority of member states support Ukraine. Only the Slovak Prime Minister, Robert Fico, has joined Orbán. Consequently, the European Council’s conclusions on Ukraine were adopted by 25 votes, excluding Hungary and Slovakia.The EU leadership has taken a firm stance on the loan issue. According to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, “the loan remains blocked because one leader is not keeping his word. But … we will get this done one way or another.” And the European Commission is actively seeking ways out of the crisis.The EU Council Conclusions express the hope that the first tranche of the recovery loan will be disbursed by early April. The efforts of individual states to raise an additional €30 billion on a bilateral basis to cover the Ukrainian budget deficit are also welcomed.Due to Budapest’s stance, the 20th package of EU sanctions against Russia has not been agreed upon. No clusters of accession negotiations have been opened.Therefore, EU leaders have confirmed their readiness to hold technical membership negotiations with Ukraine on all clusters, starting with the ‘Fundamentals’. In the future, once the issues with Budapest are resolved, the official opening and closing of completed clusters could take place almost simultaneously. At the same time, the Conclusions make no mention of any options for an accelerated path to membership for Ukraine. This is hardly surprising, given the recent criticism from key member states of the idea of ‘reverse enlargement’.The European Council also emphasised the importance of supporting Ukraine, putting pressure on Moscow and continuing international efforts to end the war with the EU’s involvement. In this regard, respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity was reaffirmed, as was the unacceptability of forcibly altering borders and rewarding the aggressor for its illegal actions.Thus, no new steps forward on Ukraine-related issues were taken in Brussels. At the same time, all previous agreements were reaffirmed, including those concerning sanctions. Today, this can be considered a significant outcome. It demonstrates that the EU is firmly sticking to its own line on the issue of Ukraine, regardless of the international context, in particular the consequences of the war in Iran and Washington’s calls for the easing of sanctions against Russia. The allies hope that after the parliamentary elections in Hungary, it will be easier to reach a compromise with Budapest. And the issues that remain blocked for the time being will be resolved.

The EU summit on 19–20 March demonstrated that conflict continues within the European Union due to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán blocking key issues relating to Ukraine, including a €90 billion reparations loan.

The EU continues to support Ukraine – despite the fallout from the war in Iran and pressure from Washington

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsThe <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2026-Unclassified-Report.pdf">document </a>analyses threats to US security and American interests around the world. Russia is mentioned not just once, but repeatedly in connection with China, North Korea and Iran.In the context of security threats to the US territory, reference is made to Moscow’s efforts to develop new, advanced or conventional delivery systems for nuclear and conventional warheads.Russia possesses the largest and most diverse arsenal of nuclear weapons and is modernising it, despite numerous failed tests of new systems. China remains intent on modernising, diversifying and expanding its nuclear capabilities for strategic competition with the US. Both countries continue to develop nuclear systems designed to penetrate or circumvent US missile defences. North Korea is firmly committed to expanding its nuclear arsenal, as evidenced by the pace of flight tests and its publicly stated uranium enrichment capabilities.Russia poses the main challenge to the US in the Arctic, as it seeks to advance its interests in the region within the context of broader global competition.Moscow aims to expand and deepen its presence there by increasing maritime trade, natural resource extraction and military activity. The bulk of Russia’s Arctic forces are concentrated on the Kola Peninsula, where around two-thirds of Russia’s second-strike nuclear capabilities are based. The Russian Northern Fleet is stationed in this area, including seven national strategic submarines armed with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.China maintains limited activities in the Arctic and seeks to advance its strategic and economic interests through its relationship with Moscow.Space threatsChina and Russia are developing anti-space capabilities to challenge US space efforts and American dominance in this sphere.Cyber threatsCyber actors from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and ransomware groups will continue to pose critical threats to US networks and critical infrastructure.Russia is also mentioned in the context of threats from chemical and biological weapons, alongside China and North Korea.Russian scientists continue to develop new capabilities to combat chemical weapons. Its intelligence services have used the nerve agent ‘Novichok’ twice since 2018 in assassination attempts, and the Russian military has used chemical agents in thousands of attacks on Ukrainian forces since 2022. China likely possesses CW (Chemical Warfare) &nbsp;capabilities that threaten US forces, allies and partners, as well as the civilian population. North Korea maintains its CW capabilities, and Pyongyang may use such weapons during a conflict or in an unconventional or covert attack.Over the past five years, Russia has undermined arms control agreements and used chemical weapons in Ukraine.However, Moscow is likely to continue to adhere to restrictions against the large-scale use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, unless there is a significant shift in its conflict with Ukraine.Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia has made nuclear threats against the US and NATO, announced the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus, and unilaterally suspended data exchanges. Moscow has also withdrawn from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Furthermore, it is developing space-based anti-satellite nuclear weapons, the deployment of which, should they be used, would contravene its obligations under the Outer Space Treaty.China, Russia, Iran and North Korea view the US as a strategic competitor and a potential adversary.They seek to counter and undermine US influence and power in the world through a range of diplomatic, economic and military means. Meanwhile, Russia continues to challenge US interests and influence, seeking to restore its influence across the former Soviet sphere, particularly in Ukraine.Selective cooperation between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, driven by a shared aim to counterbalance Washington’s efforts and actions and to support their own strategies, amplifies the threat each poses to the US. However, these relations are limited and predominantly bilateral, and the concept of a ‘hostile alliance’ exaggerates the depth of the cooperation currently taking place.Nevertheless, China’s interaction with Russia significantly enhances Moscow’s ability to sustain the war in Ukraine and withstand external pressure. China’s imports of Russian oil and natural gas provide key sources of revenue for Moscow, helping it withstand international sanctions. China’s exports of dual-use goods and technologies to Russia help sustain Moscow’s defence production, whilst reducing its incentives to achieve a ceasefire in Ukraine.China, Russia and Iran seek to maintain economic, political and military cooperation with Latin America as well, which may conflict with US interests in the region.Thus, Washington harbours no illusions regarding Moscow’s role and the threats it poses. The issues arising between Kyiv and the EU with the US administration, when the war with Russia is concerned, lie not in the assessment of threats, but in defining the objectives and methods for combating them.

The document analyses threats to US security and American interests around the world. Russia is mentioned not just once, but repeatedly in connection with China, North Korea and Iran. In the context of security threats to the US territory, reference is made to Moscow’s efforts to develop new, advanced or conventional delivery systems for nuclear and conventional warheads.

The US Intelligence Community’s Annual Report on Security Threats: No Illusions About Moscow’s Role

Kyiv Security Forum Analytics<figure class="image"><img src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/1764284283_9260_2d00d04173.jpg" alt="1764284283-9260.jpg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_1764284283_9260_2d00d04173.jpg 245w,https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_1764284283_9260_2d00d04173.jpg 500w,https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_1764284283_9260_2d00d04173.jpg 750w,https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/large_1764284283_9260_2d00d04173.jpg 1000w," sizes="100vw" width="1000px"></figure>Peace talks mediated by the US to end the war in Ukraine appear to have reached an impasse. This is now being discussed not only by journalists and experts, but also by European leaders, notably the President of Finland, Alexander Stubb.The tendency of American negotiators to make progress by playing along with Moscow and putting pressure on Ukraine has become evident not only at the negotiating table. This stance, as presented by the American and Ukrainian leaders, has, in fact, already entered the public domain.This has been facilitated by President Trump’s repeated statements that it is much easier to negotiate with Putin than with Ukraine, that he is ready for peace, and that the Ukrainian side must reach agreements with Moscow as soon as possible. Moreover, on Moscow’s terms.To encourage Kyiv to surrender its interests, including security interests, Washington is linking the provision of security guarantees to Ukraine with the withdrawal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from Donbas. And these are not rumours or unverified leaks. This was recently stated by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.Signals regarding the Pentagon’s possible use of European funds and weapons intended for Ukraine under the PURL programme for US needs in the Middle East do little to foster trust in Washington.Compounding all this is President Trump’s somewhat emotional reaction to Ukraine’s successful efforts to assist Middle Eastern states in repelling attacks by Iranian Shahed drones. This is prompted by criticism of the US head of state in the media, given that last year he missed an opportunity to prepare better for an operation in Iran when Kyiv offered its anti-drone capabilities, and Washington rejected them.Signals from Europe that the war in Iran is ‘not our war’ are also introducing a certain nervousness into Trump’s position. In response, the American president points out that he could say the same about the war in Ukraine.Russia’s military aid to Iran has not changed the White House’s position. Responding to journalists’ questions, President Trump and Defence Secretary Hexet sought to downplay the significance of Moscow’s transfer of intelligence and weapons, particularly drones, to Tehran. Nevertheless, all of this is being used to target American troops in the Middle East.Following the latest round of talks between Ukraine and the US in Florida on 21–22 March, there has been renewed talk of a possible US withdrawal from the trilateral negotiations if Ukraine does not agree to a territorial compromise regarding Donbas. And Ukraine will not do so, a fact of which the American side has already been informed in detail on numerous occasions.All this suggests that, unless the necessary adjustments are made to the format and substance of the peace talks, they may, whilst not officially terminated, effectively come to nothing in practice, focusing instead on technical and humanitarian issues. Today, against the backdrop of the war in Iran, this is not particularly important for Washington. However, with the US mid-term congressional elections approaching, the futility of Trump’s months-long peace efforts in Ukraine may take on greater significance.The optimal way out of the situation would be to officially involve the Europeans in the trilateral talks, as partners of the US and Ukraine, with Brussels being given primary responsibility for this process. This could be justified by Washington’s preoccupation with the Middle East. For a certain period, the US role could be limited to supplying arms to Ukraine, in particular, using European funds. If President Trump were to firmly support this idea, it is unlikely that Moscow would be able to categorically reject it.

Peace talks mediated by the US to end the war in Ukraine appear to have reached an impasse. This is now being discussed not only by journalists and experts, but also by European leaders, notably the President of Finland, Alexander Stubb. The tendency of American negotiators to make progress by playing along with Moscow and putting pressure on Ukraine has become evident not only at the negotiating table. This stance, as presented by the American and Ukrainian leaders, has, in fact, already entered the public domain.