Publications

<img src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/00000_2a777ae43f.jpeg" alt="00000.jpeg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_00000_2a777ae43f.jpeg 219w,https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_00000_2a777ae43f.jpeg 500w,https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_00000_2a777ae43f.jpeg 750w," sizes="100vw" width="750px">The sociological survey ‘Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country, vision of ways to solve security problems’ was conducted by the Razumkov Centre's sociological service on behalf of the Kyiv Security Forum from 31 January to 4 February 2026 using telephone interviews.&nbsp;A total of 1,003 respondents aged 18 and older living in all regions of Ukraine (except for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) were interviewed. The survey was conducted with citizens who, at the time of the survey, were located in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine and covered by the telephone networks of Ukrainian telephone operators.The structure of the sample population reflects the demographic structure of the adult population of the territories where the survey was conducted as of the beginning of 2022 (by macro-regions, age, gender, type of settlement).The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 3.2%. In the analysis, the results of this study are compared with the results of other studies conducted by the Razumkov Centre's sociological service.Key findings of the study• &nbsp; &nbsp;Ukrainians have a very high level of trust in the institutions directly responsible for the country's defence (the Armed Forces, the National Guard, the State Border Service, the Main Intelligence Directorate, and the Security Service of Ukraine), and this high level of trust has been maintained over the last three years.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The majority of respondents trust the President of Ukraine, which is partly due to his role as Commander-in-Chief.• &nbsp; &nbsp;More Ukrainians distrust the NABU, the police, the prosecutor's office, the judicial system, the government and the Verkhovna Rada than trust them. Over the past six months, the level of trust in the NABU and the judicial system has increased, while the level of trust in the police and the Verkhovna Rada has decreased.• &nbsp; &nbsp;Ukrainians have a positive attitude towards countries that consistently support Ukraine. Recently, the level of positive attitudes towards the United Kingdom and Canada has increased. Positive attitudes towards France, Germany and the EU have remained consistently high.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The majority of respondents express positive attitudes towards the US, although this share has decreased significantly over the past six months.• &nbsp; &nbsp;Negative attitudes towards China have decreased, although they remain very high (two-thirds of respondents express negative attitudes towards China).• &nbsp; &nbsp;The already extremely negative attitude towards Russia has worsened.• &nbsp; &nbsp;Almost three-quarters of respondents express a positive attitude towards NATO, but this figure has deteriorated over the past six months. &nbsp;However, support for Ukraine's accession to NATO has not declined and remains consistently high (71%).• &nbsp; &nbsp;Support for Ukraine's accession to the EU is even higher (83%).• &nbsp; &nbsp;84% of Ukrainians believe in Ukraine's victory in the war with Russia. This figure has increased significantly compared to 2025.• &nbsp; &nbsp;There is no consensus among Ukrainians on the minimum conditions necessary for concluding a peace agreement with Russia, but only 7% of respondents are willing to cede territories (in Donbas and southern Ukraine) currently controlled by Ukraine for the sake of peace.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The vast majority of respondents believe that in order to sign a peace agreement with Russia, it is impossible to compromise on real security guarantees, assistance in Ukraine's economic recovery, reparations from Russia in favour of Ukraine, control over Donbas, and Russia's responsibility for war crimes. A relative majority of respondents believe that Ukraine's course towards EU and NATO membership should not be compromised.•⁠ &nbsp;⁠Only a third of respondents believe that the Ukrainian government is successfully negotiating with the US, EU and Russia on a possible peace agreement.•⁠ &nbsp;⁠Three-quarters of respondents believe that if a peace agreement is signed between Ukraine and Russia, Russia will violate the agreement and attack Ukraine as soon as it suits them. This number has increased significantly compared to May and September 2025.• &nbsp;More than two-thirds of respondents are convinced that even if Ukraine withdraws its troops from the entire Donbas region, Russia will continue its aggression.•⁠ &nbsp;⁠As was the case six months ago, two-thirds of respondents believe that Russia is planning to attack one of the NATO countries.&nbsp; However, during this time, the proportion of those who believe that it definitely intends to do so has decreased, while the proportion of those who believe that it may intend to attack has increased.•⁠ &nbsp;⁠The vast majority of respondents believe that NATO is capable of effectively defending itself in the event of an attack by Russia.•⁠ &nbsp;⁠Three-quarters of respondents reported poor energy supply during the week before the survey, more than a third reported poor heating, and another 1-2% of respondents had no heating or energy supply at all. 60% of respondents had no problems with heating, and a quarter had no problems with energy supply.•⁠ &nbsp;⁠The vast majority of Ukrainians blame Russian troops for the prolonged disruption of electricity, water and heat supplies. However, at the same time, almost half of those surveyed also blame local authorities, which is significantly more than in December 2022.&nbsp;• &nbsp;Three-quarters of those surveyed said that their town or village had been affected by Russian attacks, and 8% said that they or their families had suffered physical or material damage as a result of Russian attacks.•⁠ &nbsp;⁠A relative majority of respondents believe that Ukraine should respond in kind to Russian attacks on critical infrastructure. More than a third of respondents believe that Ukraine should intensify its attacks on Russian critical infrastructure, and only 5% agree to accept all of Russia's conditions in order to end the war.The results of the sociological survey can be found here:<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Res0126tel1000_ENG_11_bez_numeracziyi_e643154057.pdf">Results of the sociological survey</a><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/dyn0226_ENG_11_5849c9ebd5.pdf">Dynamics of the sociological survey</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

The sociological survey ‘Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country, vision of ways to solve security problems’ was conducted by the Razumkov Centre's sociological service on behalf of the Kyiv Security Forum from 31 January to 4 February 2026 using telephone interviews. 

Results of a sociological survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre and commissioned by the Kyiv Security Forum


The Kyiv Security Forum co-organised an event at the Munich Security Conference for the first time, making energy security its key topic. The discussion ‘Energy Warfare: How to Unplug Tyranny’ brought together Ukrainian and international politicians, diplomats, experts and energy market leaders.<o:p></o:p>The context of the conversation is crucial: the energy situation in Ukraine is extremely difficult due to continuous Russian attacks. Since the beginning of 2026 alone, there have been 217 attacks on energy facilities, and during Russia's full-scale invasion, more than a thousand strikes have been carried out on Ukraine's energy system.<o:p></o:p>The massive strikes have led to regular large-scale power outages. The blackouts lasted 10-20 hours during the winter of 2022-2023 and 10-16 hours per day during peak periods in 2024-2025. However, these restrictions do not seem as severe as those experienced in January-February 2026.<o:p></o:p>Since the beginning of this year, more people have been leaving the country precisely because of the lack of stable electricity, heating and water. Some cities were temporarily left without water supply due to the power outages at pumping stations.According to the National Bank's forecasts, the destruction of the energy system will significantly slow down economic growth in 2026.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p>Energy genocide in figures<o:p></o:p>Chairman of the Kyiv&nbsp; Security Forum, Prime Minister of Ukraine in 2014-2016, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, began the discussion with <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://ksf.openukraine.org/en/categories/news/tri-chverti-ukrayinciv-mayut-problemi-z-elektropostachannyam-ta-opalennyam">shocking data</a> from a sociological study commissioned by the KSF: about 40% of Ukrainians have problems with heating in the midst of frosts, and 74% face unstable electricity supply.<img alt="WhatsApp Image 2026-02-14 at 19.35.19 (1).jpeg" src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1_750bc96d6d.jpeg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1_750bc96d6d.jpeg 235w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1_750bc96d6d.jpeg 500w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1_750bc96d6d.jpeg 750w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/large_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1_750bc96d6d.jpeg 1000w" sizes="100vw" width="1000"><o:p></o:p>The vast majority of Ukrainians (almost 80%) blame Russian troops for the prolonged disruption of electricity, water and heat supplies. At the same time, almost half of those surveyed blame local authorities (three times more than in December 2022). One in five respondents points to the responsibility of private and municipal service providers, while 17% blame the President and the Ukrainian government. The proportion of those who blame Western countries for insufficient assistance has fallen sharply over three years, from 25% to 4.3%. Ukrainians appreciate the help of their partners, in particular in the form of transformers and generators, which are coming to the aid of Ukrainian energy companies.<o:p></o:p><o:p></o:p>‘This is a war of attrition. What energy companies are doing is truly impressive — their work is heroic. But we must prepare for next winter. And only God knows how many more winters like this lie ahead,’ emphasised Arseniy Yatsenyuk.<o:p></o:p>Survival formula: air defence, finance and equipment<o:p></o:p>DTEK CEO Maksym Timchenko confirmed the complexity of the situation and explained what is needed to find a systematic solution to the issue.<o:p></o:p>According to Timchenko, the main priority at the moment is to protect the remaining energy facilities. Ukraine urgently needs interceptor missiles for air defence and powerful portable generators. Although Ukraine has the necessary launchers, there is an acute shortage of interceptor missiles. The CEO of DTEK explained that the existing counter-drone systems effectively cover the facilities, but they are not capable of repelling massive attacks.<img alt="WhatsApp Image 2026-02-14 at 19.35.18.jpeg" src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_18_8da671378b.jpeg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_18_8da671378b.jpeg 235w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_18_8da671378b.jpeg 500w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_18_8da671378b.jpeg 750w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/large_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_18_8da671378b.jpeg 1000w" sizes="100vw" width="1000"><o:p></o:p>Apart from air defence, the energy system needs support to increase electricity production. The supply of large mobile generators that can be connected to powerless apartment buildings will allow critical systems to be restored and buildings to remain functional.<o:p></o:p>Alongside international aid, DTEK specialists are sourcing used transformers and other equipment in European countries that can be adapted for the company's Ukrainian power plants.<o:p></o:p>According to Timchenko, these measures are critical for Ukraine to withstand Russia's pressure and survive the energy war.<o:p></o:p>He revealed that the restoration budget for DTEK's own power generation facilities alone would require €300 million, half of which the company has already covered with its own resources. Another €150 million is needed to restore 4,000 MW of capacity, which will be sufficient to get through the next heating season.<o:p></o:p>To stabilise the system for the next winter, energy experts have set a cut-off date of May. Equipment orders must be placed by then, as the supply cycle takes at least 10 months.<o:p></o:p>Oleksiy Ryabchyn, Director of International and Sustainable Development at Naftogaz Group, emphasised that in the context of the rejection of Russian energy resources, every energy facility on the European continent becomes a geopolitical target for Russia: ‘That is why we are here in Munich and at other venues communicating with our partners and holding joint consultations on how to counter the Russian threat. Because now energy companies are not only producers but also defenders of energy.<img alt="WhatsApp Image 2026-02-14 at 19.35.16.jpeg" src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_02c3364cde.jpeg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_02c3364cde.jpeg 235w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_02c3364cde.jpeg 500w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_02c3364cde.jpeg 750w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/large_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_02c3364cde.jpeg 1000w" sizes="100vw" width="1000"><o:p></o:p>The Naftogaz representative emphasised the importance of international partner's support: "On the one hand, we are mobilising resources — attracting grant funding, preferential loans, international support and financing for the restoration of destroyed equipment. Naftogaz is cooperating with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank, the governments of the United States, Norway and various EU and G7 countries to raise funds for gas purchases to compensate for volumes that have been destroyed or lost. On the other hand, we are simultaneously pursuing an equally important business track regarding projects and attracting investments in joint projects with our foreign partners.<o:p></o:p>Ryabchyn noted that Russia has damaged a significant amount of extremely expensive equipment — compressor stations, gas turbines, oil and gas and power infrastructure. The strikes are carried out not only with drones and missiles, but also with artillery. It is impossible to quickly restore the equipment due to the scale of the destruction.<o:p></o:p>‘It takes at least 12 months to manufacture new equipment, yet it is needed urgently. Furthermore, the involvement of foreign technical specialists, who are required to provide engineering supervision and support for the implementation of such projects, poses a challenge,’ stated Oleksiy Ryabchyn.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p>According to him, Naftogaz has already begun preparing for the next heating season, which, if Russian shelling continues, may also be difficult, especially given the limited operation of the power system.<o:p></o:p>The decentralisation strategy: Khrushchevkas with autonomous heating<o:p></o:p>Former Naftogaz CEO Andriy Kobolev has called for an end to any attempts to revive the Soviet model of large thermal power plants, which are ideal military targets. Instead, he suggests a path to diversification – a transition to small, autonomous generating capacities.<figure class="image"><img alt="WhatsApp Image 2026-02-14 at 19.35.16 (1).jpeg" src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_1_fc3c5008da.jpeg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_1_fc3c5008da.jpeg 235w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_1_fc3c5008da.jpeg 500w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_1_fc3c5008da.jpeg 750w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/large_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_1_fc3c5008da.jpeg 1000w" sizes="100vw" width="1000"></figure>"If we take about 5,000 old Soviet Khrushchevkas (apartment buildings which were designed and constructed in the Soviet Union from the early 1960s onwards, when their namesake, Nikita Khrushchev, was leader of the Soviet Union –&nbsp;ed.) in Kyiv and convert them to autonomous systems, the cost of the project will be about €1.5 billion. This is cheaper than anti-aircraft defence and much more sustainable. If you have your own system, you control it," Kobolev explained.<o:p></o:p>He added that attracting private investors is possible even during wartime through military risk insurance mechanisms (DFC).<o:p></o:p>Military response: long-range capabilities as a means of deterrence<o:p></o:p>The participants agreed that it is impossible to defend oneself forever. Former US Special Representative for Ukraine Kurt Volker believes that Western leaders must provide the means to prevent attacks.<o:p></o:p>"Air defence is a necessary temporary measure.&nbsp;It is needed when other mechanisms do not work. But we must focus on preventing attacks. This is a combination of long-range weapons that can destroy rocket fuel manufacturing facilities, rocket and drone production plants, and airfields from which they are launched," Volker emphasised.<o:p></o:p>Former CIA Director and Member of the KSF Security Council, General David Petraeus, noted that Ukraine is already demonstrating incredible capabilities in the production of long-range weapons.<img alt="WhatsApp Image 2026-02-14 at 19.35.17.jpeg" src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_17_60986817b4.jpeg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_17_60986817b4.jpeg 235w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_17_60986817b4.jpeg 500w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_17_60986817b4.jpeg 750w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/large_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_17_60986817b4.jpeg 1000w" sizes="100vw" width="1000"><o:p></o:p>"The Flamingo cruise missile has a range of about 3,000 kilometres. That's a tremendous range.&nbsp;When it goes into serial production, it will be more effective than most of the possible supplies from the West," Petraeus noted.<o:p></o:p>Economic pressure and sanctions<o:p></o:p>Volker also stressed that in order to achieve a truce, pressure on Russia, primarily economic pressure, must be significantly stronger.<o:p></o:p>The head of the Permanent Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security, Defence and Intelligence, Yegor Cherniev, agreed with him and stressed that the energy war must also be waged in the economic sphere.<img alt="WhatsApp Image 2026-02-14 at 19.35.15.jpeg" src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_15_7514c8caf6.jpeg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_15_7514c8caf6.jpeg 235w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_15_7514c8caf6.jpeg 500w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_15_7514c8caf6.jpeg 750w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/large_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_15_7514c8caf6.jpeg 1000w" sizes="100vw" width="1000"><o:p></o:p>He noted that Russia is constantly changing its tactics and varying the trajectories of ballistic missiles. According to intelligence reports, there are no signs that Russia is willing to stop.<o:p></o:p>“On the contrary, their production is increasing and is aimed at increasing the volume and diversity of weapons – ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as drones. What we need now is to destroy their military potential. The second key point is to destroy their economy with sanctions. And this applies to their sources of budget revenue. Sanctions since 2022 have helped to reduce the potential of the Russian army. At the same time, the potential for new sanctions in the oil and gas, energy and related sectors remains significant. I am convinced that it is cheaper for our partners to restrict Russia's sources of income than to constantly spend money on air defence systems," emphasised Yegor Cherniev.<o:p></o:p>Joint Action Plan<o:p></o:p>Following the roundtable discussion, Arseniy Yatsenyuk initiated the preparation of a joint letter to the European Commission and the governments of EU countries.<img alt="WhatsApp Image 2026-02-14 at 19.35.19.jpeg" src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1dfef843bf.jpeg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1dfef843bf.jpeg 235w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1dfef843bf.jpeg 500w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1dfef843bf.jpeg 750w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/large_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1dfef843bf.jpeg 1000w" sizes="100vw" width="1000"><o:p></o:p>This document will send a clear signal about the specific technologies, resources and financial instruments that the Ukrainian energy sector needs today.<o:p></o:p>The next stage of discussions is scheduled for the end of April in Kyiv, where a concrete action plan for the protection and modernisation of the Ukrainian energy sector will be presented.<o:p></o:p>The Kyiv Security Forum was founded in 2007 on the initiative of Arseniy Yatsenyuk. The Munich Security Conference is the most influential international forum for discussing global security issues.<o:p></o:p>

How to unplug tyranny and survive next winter: conclusions of the Kyiv Security Forum discussion at a joint event in Munich

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsDespite Washington's optimistic statements about the agreement on 90% of the peace plan and the constructive nature of the latest rounds of peace talks in Abu Dhabi, recent statements by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, his deputy Grushko, and Putin's press secretary Peskov regarding the preconditions for a ceasefire sounded discordant.Apparently, the problematic aspects are not only of a territorial nature. The Russian side emphasises the need to provide ‘security guarantees’ not only to Ukraine but also to Russia. At the same time, the Russian side sees these guarantees in the context of ensuring the most favourable conditions for future aggression. How else can one interpret the demands to prohibit Ukraine's membership in NATO, the deployment of NATO troops on the territory of our state, and the cessation of its use to ‘create threats’ to Russia? And this is coming from the aggressor state!Moreover, Russia has already begun to put forward additional and obviously unacceptable demands on territorial issues, in particular regarding the recognition of the Russian status of the occupied territories.More recently, Lavrov went even further in his territorial claims. In a speech to the Russian diplomatic corps, he stressed that ‘the people of Crimea, Donbas and Novorossiya have expressed their will in referendums, and [Russia] will see through the process of returning these “historically Russian” lands to their “native harbour”.’ And everyone knows where the borders of the ‘ancient Russian’ lands lie – wherever Russian soldiers can reach.Lavrov also questioned Moscow's willingness to compromise on the issue of the rights of so-called ‘Russian speakers.’ According to him, ‘the linguistic, cultural and religious rights of those who remain under the authority of Kyiv must be restored.’Russian officials also emphasise that success in the negotiations can only be achieved if the positions agreed upon at the meeting between the American and Russian leaders in Anchorage are adhered to. At the same time, the content of these supposedly reached agreements is not disclosed. However, disappointment is expressed that the American side is moving away from them.Given how the meeting in Anchorage ended – with a demonstratively shortened press conference and the cancellation of a friendly lunch – there are serious doubts about the parties' common understanding of the results of this event. This is not to mention the status that any talks between the US and Russian presidents about Ukraine can have without taking Ukraine's opinion into account.In this context, the ‘constructive’ peace negotiation process looks like a simple delaying tactic. Russia is doing this to avoid new sanctions. Ukraine is forced to play along in order to protect itself from a new suspension of US military support, in particular the transfer of intelligence and the sale of weapons.US President Trump has so far rejected all proposals to increase pressure on Moscow to bring it to its senses, even when they come from his political allies. At the same time, the White House is seeking to achieve some kind of result as quickly as possible and is insisting on a territorial compromise on the Ukrainian side, ignoring the inconsistencies in the Russian side's agreement on other aspects of the peace plan that are included in the aforementioned 90%.But such a flimsy structure of artificial ‘peace agreements’ is bound to collapse.New sanctions on Russia would not only be a more effective tool for achieving a truce, but would also increase the level of support for Republicans in American society. After all, there is still a prevailing demand for support for Ukraine.

Despite Washington's optimistic statements about the agreement on 90% of the peace plan and the constructive nature of the latest rounds of peace talks in Abu Dhabi, recent statements by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, his deputy Grushko, and Putin's press secretary Peskov regarding the preconditions for a ceasefire sounded discordant.

Progress in peace talks with Russia

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsOn February 28, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale operation against Iran. Strikes were carried out on Tehran (including the area of the presidential palace and the National Security Council), as well as on Isfahan, Karaj and other centres of military and nuclear infrastructure.The key issues are not limited to the nuclear programme. Reportedly, senior Iranian leadership may have been killed or injured. If this is confirmed, it will no longer be a question of ‘containment’ but of the potential collapse of the regime.The reason for the operation was the de facto failure of negotiations: Tehran has refused to transfer highly enriched uranium abroad, accept permanent restrictions and dismantle its nuclear infrastructure.&nbsp; Negotiations on the missile programme and support for proxy forces were also rejected. US President Donald Trump said that Iran had resumed its pursuit of nuclear weapons and called on the Iranian people to overthrow the regime after the operation was completed.Iran responded with strikes on Israel and American bases in the region. The Persian Gulf found itself in a zone of direct military escalation. Europe called for restraint. Russia sided with Tehran.Will this bring peace closer for Ukraine?If the regime in Tehran weakens or falls, it will be a blow to the Russia-Iran-China axis. Iran is an important supplier of resources and technology for the Russian war. Its destabilisation means a weakening of the Kremlin and a reduction in its negotiating power.Thus, a possible temporary rise in oil prices could give Russia a short-term financial boost. But strategically, the fall or deep weakening of the Iranian regime would mean the weakening of the entire authoritarian bloc.Therefore, the decisive factor will not be the scale of the strikes, but the answer to one question: is a political breakdown beginning in Iran, and with it a strategic weakening of the anti-Western coalition?

On February 28, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale operation against Iran. Strikes were carried out on Tehran (including the area of the presidential palace and the National Security Council), as well as on Isfahan, Karaj and other centres of military and nuclear infrastructure.

Strike on Iran: the beginning of dismantling the authoritarian axis?

An attack by the US and Israel on Iran won't cause oil prices to shoot up for long – Iranian oil supplies are pretty much tied to China, which, even in the worst-case scenario, will be able to partly replace them with alternative suppliers.These could include, for example, OPEC+ countries, whose total quota in 2025 has increased by almost 2.9 million barrels per day. For comparison, oil supplies from Iran to China, according to various estimates, amount to between 1.5 and 2 million barrels per day.In the medium to long term, the US operation in Iran will lead to prices stabilising at medium or relatively low levels – no more than $60 per barrel.The reasons are as follows:<ul><li>on the one hand, a temporary jump in prices will create a favourable backdrop for an increase in OPEC+ quotas, which has been put on hold until the first quarter of 2026; &nbsp;</li><li>if the bombing forces Iran to reach an agreement with the US, the oil embargo on Iran will likely be lifted, and the Iranian oil industry will gain access to the services of international oil service companies.</li></ul>In both cases, the bombing of Iran will result in an increase in oil supply, which will help to ‘cool down’ the situation on the oil market.If the war in Iraq ushered in an era of high oil prices, then the US military operation in Iran could bring it to an end.

An attack by the US and Israel on Iran won't cause oil prices to shoot up for long – Iranian oil supplies are pretty much tied to China, which, even in the worst-case scenario, will be able to partly replace them with alternative suppliers.

Vyacheslav BUTKO 

What the bombing of Iran means for the oil market

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsThe military operation by the United States and Israel against Iran is increasingly showing signs of dragging on. While its duration was initially expected to be a matter of days, then weeks, observers are now referring to internal Pentagon estimates that suggest it could last for months. Interim elections to the US Congress are effectively becoming the political horizon for this campaign. At the same time, the question arises: will Washington be able to continue to fully control the dynamics of the conflict?At the same time, the strategic objectives of the operation are becoming increasingly blurred. Initially, the goal was to eliminate Iran's nuclear and missile programmes and physically remove key political and military leaders of the regime. Now, however, a broader formula is increasingly being heard: the removal of the Ayatollahs' religious regime from power. However, the key moment for the implementation of such a scenario has probably been lost. The large-scale anti-government protests in Iran did not receive the external support that their participants had hoped for. Instead, Washington has begun a new round of negotiations with the Iranian leadership. In these circumstances, the opposition, weakened and fragmented, is unlikely to be ready for a new attempt at large-scale political action. Cooperation with Kurdish armed groups could be a possible tool for putting pressure on Tehran. However, even if a limited ground operation involving Kurdish forces were to be carried out, it would only result in a change of control over individual provinces. This is unlikely to lead to the fall of the central authority of the ayatollahs in Tehran.Calculations about an internal split in the regime's security forces also proved to be wrong. US President Donald Trump's calls for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to side with the opposition have no real basis. Moreover, some of the moderate Iranian politicians on whom Washington had been counting were killed in Israeli strikes on the government quarter, along with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Others, such as current President Masoud Pezeshkian, have no real influence on the key power structures of the state. It was also telling that Pezeshkian's promises to refrain from strikes on Arab countries were demonstratively ignored by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.At the same time, the initial military results of the campaign should not be underestimated. The US and Israel have managed to destroy a significant part of Iran's air defence systems, seriously weaken its navy, strike its missile infrastructure and partially paralyse the export capabilities of its oil sector. However, even under these conditions, it is extremely difficult to predict when the operation will end. Moreover, President Trump no longer rules out the possibility of a limited ground operation – for example, to seize enriched uranium stocks.The energy component is becoming one of the key implications of the conflict. Oil and gas prices are rising rapidly. The Strait of Hormuz remains formally open, but has effectively ceased to be used due to constant shelling. The US promises to guarantee the safety of shipping have not yet been fulfilled. China's calls for Tehran to resume transit, even if they have some impact, are unlikely to change the situation quickly.Additional pressure on global energy markets is being created by attacks on the oil and gas infrastructure of other countries in the region. Some facilities have been damaged, while others have been temporarily shut down for safety reasons.For Ukraine, the war around Iran has a double effect. On the one hand, the weakening of Tehran, Russia's key military and technological partner, has an obvious positive impact. The destruction of part of the missile and drone production facilities, as well as stocks of Shahed-type drones, directly affects Moscow's ability to continue the war against Ukraine.On the other hand, the conflict poses serious risks. First and foremost, there is a sharp rise in global energy prices, which directly increases Russian budget revenues and gives the Kremlin additional resources to rebuild its military potential. The shortage of air defence systems is also becoming a separate problem. Kyiv is already talking officially about a possible shortage of missiles for Patriot systems, and there is no quick solution to this problem in sight.Ukraine's cooperation with the US and Arab states in countering Iranian drones could strengthen our country's international image and increase interest in the Ukrainian experience. However, this does not solve the key problem – protection against Russian ballistic missiles.At the same time, the conflict complicates the prospects for peace talks with Russia. Even Washington's demonstrative unwillingness to exacerbate relations with Moscow over its intelligence support for Iran is unlikely to change the Kremlin's position.Europe is also among the main victims of the war in the Middle East. Rising energy prices and the risk of new migration flows are putting significant political pressure on European governments. This complicates the maintenance of transatlantic unity, especially against the backdrop of President Trump's harsh criticism of certain European allies who have expressed doubts about the advisability of an offensive operation against Iran.In these circumstances, it is critically important for Ukraine not only to ensure uninterrupted supplies of air defence systems, but also to seek to expand its long-range capabilities. Under current conditions, the destruction of the Russian military-industrial complex's production capabilities is becoming one of the key tools for deterring aggression – not only for Ukraine, but also for the security of Europe as a whole.

The military operation by the United States and Israel against Iran is increasingly showing signs of dragging on. While its duration was initially expected to be a matter of days, then weeks, observers are now referring to internal Pentagon estimates that suggest it could last for months. Interim elections to the US Congress are effectively becoming the political horizon for this campaign. At the same time, the question arises: will Washington be able to continue to fully control the dynamics of the conflict?

War in Iran: signs of a protracted operation and new geopolitical risks

Kyiv Security Forum Analytics• &nbsp; &nbsp;Hungary is entering a decisive phase of political struggle. Parliamentary elections will be held on 12 April, and for the first time in many years, there is a real prospect that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has ruled the country since 2010, will lose power.• &nbsp; &nbsp;For the first time, the opposition has a significant lead over the ruling party. According to a poll by Zavecz Research (22–28 February) among voters who have made up their minds, 50% support the Tisza party and 38% support Fidesz. Among all voters, the figures are 38% against 32%. About 20% are still uncertain.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The new leader in Hungarian politics is Péter Magyar, a former ally of Orbán. He heads the Tisza party and is campaigning under the slogans of fighting corruption, unblocking EU funds and returning Hungary to the European mainstream.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The elections are effectively turning into a referendum on the geopolitical course: continued confrontation with the EU and semi-isolation, or a return to democratic Europe and strengthening the country's role in the EU and NATO.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The economic situation is weakening the government's position: GDP growth is less than 1%, the budget deficit is over 4%, industrial production is falling and prices are rising. More than €19 billion in EU funds remain blocked due to problems with the rule of law and corruption.• &nbsp; &nbsp;Orbán has made conflict with Brussels and Kyiv part of his political strategy. His government is blocking new sanctions against Russia, slowing down negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU and opposing a large financial aid package for Ukraine.• &nbsp; &nbsp;Anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become one of the key themes of Fidesz's election campaign. Orbán is spreading narratives about an alleged ‘Ukrainian threat’ to Hungary's energy system and sharply criticising Kyiv, while barely reacting to Moscow's actions.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The detention of Ukrainian cash collectors by Hungarian law enforcement agencies caused a scandal. This involved the stopping and detention of cash collection vehicles belonging to a Ukrainian bank during a regular currency transport operation. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs rightly called these actions a de facto taking of people hostage. The incident is a telling example of how even forceful and diplomatic mechanisms are used by Budapest to exert political pressure on Ukraine.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The stance of the opposition towards Ukraine is not clear-cut. The Tisza party did not support the aid package for Ukraine in the European Parliament, and Magyar himself spoke out against Ukraine's accelerated accession to the EU and the transfer of weapons.• &nbsp; &nbsp;At the same time, the arrival of the new government will almost certainly mean an end to the demonstrative pro-Russian policy and the systematic blocking of EU decisions on Ukraine.• &nbsp; &nbsp;A poll conducted by the Tisza party showed that about 60% of Hungarians support Ukraine's accession to the EU, which indicates that anti-Ukrainian rhetoric is largely a product of political propaganda.• &nbsp; &nbsp;Even if the opposition wins, Hungary will not automatically become an ally of Ukraine, but it may cease to be the main blocker of European policy towards Kyiv.

Hungary is entering a decisive phase of political struggle. Parliamentary elections will be held on 12 April, and for the first time in many years, there is a real prospect that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has ruled the country since 2010, will lose power. For the first time, the opposition has a significant lead over the ruling party. 

What should we know about the situation in Hungary?

Gas is becoming just as crucial a factor in the war as oil. The damage to QatarEnergy’s infrastructure and the suspension of part of its production have highlighted the vulnerability of the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) market. Qatar accounts for around 20% of global LNG supplies, and there is virtually no spare capacity to quickly make up for these volumes. This is of particular concern for Europe, as after 2022 its energy balance will rely heavily on LNG imports.The scope for quickly replacing Middle Eastern gas is limited. The US remains the largest alternative supplier, but its export infrastructure is already operating at near-capacity. Even the planned increase in exports of around 15 million tonnes per year would not be enough to offset Qatari volumes, which amount to around 80 million tonnes annually.Norway is also operating at the limits of its production capacity. This means that in the event of a protracted crisis, the market will face not only rising prices but also the risk of a physical gas shortage.In this situation, Russia gains an additional lever of pressure over the European market. Russia is already signalling the possibility of halting gas supplies to the EU ahead of the deadlines set by Brussels. Putin has stated outright that rising prices in Europe are linked to competition for more solvent markets. Meanwhile, American LNG will go where the price is higher – that is, to Asia. The Russian leader has stated that an accelerated reorientation of exports towards alternative destinations is being worked on, although for now this looks more like tactical blackmail. However, against the backdrop of possible supply disruptions from the Persian Gulf, this strengthens Russia’s negotiating position in both Europe and Asia.Be that as it may, Russia stands to gain the most from a halt to Qatari gas supplies. And this benefit is not limited to a temporary rise in prices (though we do not know how temporary this rise will be – Iran, it seems, is prepared to block the Strait of Hormuz for a long time). The main benefit for Russia is that it will now be much more difficult to block supplies of Russian LNG. This is because consumers – primarily Asian countries – will realise that even if the Strait of Hormuz is unblocked in the near future, it could be blocked again at any moment, and they must always have a ‘Plan B’ in place for such an eventuality.At the same time, Europe will realise that due to the ‘Asian premium’ – the ability and willingness of Asian countries to pay a higher price – American gas will go not to Europe, but to Asia. And it is by no means out of the question that Europe will be tempted to return to Russian gas. Initially, this would be temporary. But, as the saying goes, ‘nothing is more permanent than the temporary’.The key question for the coming weeks is the extent to which regional players will be drawn in. If the conflict remains within its current boundaries and is limited to an exchange of blows between Iran, Israel and their allies, it will enter a phase of protracted confrontation involving economic pressure and periodic strikes on infrastructure.But if hostilities affect major energy facilities in the Gulf states or a de facto complete and strict blockade of the Strait of Hormuz takes place (formally, it has not been closed, but traffic has been drastically reduced and insurance costs have soared), the conflict will quickly escalate into a global energy crisis with corresponding consequences for the world economy.Vyacheslav ButkoEconomic Adviser to the Kyiv Security Forum

Gas is becoming just as crucial a factor in the war as oil. The damage to QatarEnergy’s infrastructure and the suspension of part of its production have highlighted the vulnerability of the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) market. Qatar accounts for around 20% of global LNG supplies, and there is virtually no spare capacity to quickly make up for these volumes. This is of particular concern for Europe, as after 2022 its energy balance will rely heavily on LNG imports.

On the impact of the war in the Middle East on the global gas market

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsThe war in Iran has posed a serious challenge for many countries around the world: loss of investment, rising energy prices, economic problems and security risks.China is no exception. As part of the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ between China and Iran, a 25-year, $400 billion agreement was signed in 2021 to invest in Iran’s energy, infrastructure and banking sectors, partly in exchange for discounts on oil exports to China. And this channel has been utilised very extensively by both sides. In 2025, Tehran exported over 80 per cent of its oil to China.China also receives a significant portion of its energy resources from other Middle Eastern countries, whose export potential is now in doubt, at least in the immediate future.It is difficult to say to what extent temporary energy supply issues are actually affecting China. After all, during the first two months of this year, Beijing imported 15.8 per cent more oil compared to the same period last year. As was the case throughout 2025, China has been replenishing its strategic reserves to protect against geopolitical risks.At the same time, Beijing is holding talks with Tehran regarding the unimpeded passage of Chinese goods through the Strait of Hormuz. It is not yet clear whether final agreements have been reached between the parties. However, other countries have already begun to use the Chinese factor to enhance security when transiting the strait. By identifying their vessels, cargo and crews as Chinese, they seek to avoid coming under fire from the IRGC. Nevertheless, such ‘know-how’ is unlikely to function reliably and for the long term without official support from Beijing.The Middle East is important to Beijing in terms of exports of goods and technology, particularly following the deterioration of trade relations with the US. China’s exports to this region in 2025 grew almost twice as fast as its exports to the rest of the world. China’s technological achievements in the field of renewable energy have attracted interest. The United Arab Emirates has become the fastest-growing market for Chinese car manufacturers. Demand for Chinese steel from Saudi Arabia and its neighbours has doubled.Chinese investment in the Middle East is also growing faster than anywhere else in the world. Chinese financial institutions have provided loans to oil refineries, liquefied natural gas (LNG) production facilities and seaports, and have financed the expansion of oil production, railway infrastructure, power grids, petrochemical plants, goods transport and so on.However, it cannot be said that the war in Iran has not brought China certain dividends, especially if one thinks strategically rather than in terms of financial gain.Official Beijing condemned the operation against Iran from the very outset and began calling for an end to the war. The reputation as a global pillar of stability and security is one of the ‘trump cards’ of China’s foreign policy. Through this unique form of ‘soft power’, it seeks to win over other countries, strengthen its geopolitical influence and improve its economic prospects. In many cases, this is an effective factor, particularly when compared to Washington’s unpredictability.Of course, Taiwan and Beijing’s policy of escalating the situation surrounding the island are an exception. However, Washington’s large-scale military action in Iran is, in this regard, not only a temptation for Beijing but also a serious deterrent.The rift between Moscow and Beijing, so desired by US President Donald Trump, has also been put on hold, at the very least, and in the event of a protracted war with Iran, it is called into question. After all, with the reduction in energy supplies from the Middle East, Russia is becoming even more attractive. Consequently, Moscow’s already excessive trade dependence on Beijing is intensifying. Unfortunately, this may also strengthen the strategic ties between the two capitals.Nor should China’s strategic ties with Iran be considered lost, at least until Islamists seize power in that country – a scenario that is not yet on the horizon. Given Beijing’s close ties with Middle Eastern countries, its unique opportunities for peacemaking in the region remain intact. This is particularly true against the backdrop of Washington’s increasingly controversial reputation.In theory, one could also predict an increase in Beijing’s global influence due to its ability to ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. False signals about a ‘Chinese footprint’ may well be replaced by official Chinese protection.Thus, a war in Iran will not destroy the ‘axis of evil’, but it could significantly alter the distribution of roles within it, and in a way that strengthens China.

The war in Iran has posed a serious challenge for many countries around the world: loss of investment, rising energy prices, economic problems and security risks. China is no exception. As part of the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ between China and Iran, a 25-year, $400 billion agreement was signed in 2021 to invest in Iran’s energy, infrastructure and banking sectors, partly in exchange for discounts on oil exports to China. And this channel has been utilised very extensively by both sides. In 2025, Tehran exported over 80 per cent of its oil to China.

China: a beneficiary or a victim?

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsUkraine has become one of the main targets of the Fidesz party’s election campaign. In this regard, we find ourselves in ‘good company’ – alongside the leadership of the European Union. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán regularly attacks European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, accusing Brussels of supporting Ukraine.Fidesz’s anti-Ukrainian rhetoric goes hand in hand with its anti-European campaign. And this is happening in a country that has received billions of euros in financial support from the EU for decades.The ruling party is trying to convince Hungarian society that the source of the country’s economic problems is Ukraine. Not the miscalculations of government economic policy, not the consequences of Russian aggression, not global energy shocks — but Ukraine itself.The rise in energy prices in Budapest is attributed to the suspension of the Druzhba oil pipeline, damaged by a Russian strike. However, the blame is shifted onto Kyiv — allegedly, Ukraine is not clearing up the aftermath of the attack quickly enough or is exaggerating its scale. To ‘confirm’ this version, a group of Hungarian ‘experts’ is being sent to Ukraine in a show of force — without consultation with Kyiv and with maximum media coverage. It is clear that this is not about expertise, but a propaganda stunt.At the same time, Orbán has not voiced a single word of criticism towards Russia. Some observers even suggest that the attack on the oil pipeline could have been part of a broader Russian-Hungarian information operation aimed at discrediting Ukraine.In this same context, one should also consider the detention in Hungary of two Oschadbank cash-in-transit vehicles carrying cash sent by the Austrian Raiffeisen Bank in accordance with the current agreement. The money will obviously be returned — but quietly and only after the elections. For now, however, this act, which has rightly been called ‘state banditry’ in Kyiv, is being used to create an image of alleged Ukrainian corruption. At the same time, Budapest’s propaganda reports prefer not to mention the fact that an Austrian bank was involved in the deal.Blocking negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU is another central element of Orbán’s policy. His arguments boil down to a simple slogan: Ukraine’s membership allegedly harms Hungary’s interests. Budapest ignores rational explanations that it is precisely the negotiations that should determine the terms of accession — after all, it is blocking them itself. In this logic, it is not Hungarian but Russian interests that are becoming increasingly apparent. Orbán’s recent statement about his desire to see Ukraine as a ‘buffer’ between Hungary and Russia is also telling.Russian influence is also evident in Budapest’s energy policy. Orbán is proposing to lift part of the EU’s energy sanctions against Moscow, is blocking the 20th package of sanctions, and is also blocking a €90 billion loan to Ukraine — despite the fact that Hungary had already agreed to this mechanism last year following a compromise with its partners. Now Budapest is effectively reneging on its own commitments — behaviour that Brussels considers unacceptable. But for the election campaign, it seems, any means are fair game.The European Commission is responding cautiously, trying to avoid accusations of interfering in the elections. Nevertheless, such accusations are still being levelled — without any basis. Fidesz needs them to mobilise the electorate against its main opponent — Péter Magyar, leader of the Tisa party, whom government propaganda portrays as a ‘puppet of Brussels’.Despite this, the European Union is hoping for political change. Opinion polls provide grounds for such expectations. In early March, a survey by the 21 Research Centre, commissioned by the publication 24.hu, showed that among decided voters, 53% support Péter Magyar and 39% support Viktor Orbán.However, regardless of the election results, the future of Ukrainian-Hungarian relations will require serious work. The Orbán government’s long-standing anti-Ukrainian campaign has significantly distorted the atmosphere between our nations. According to the Pew Research Center (July 2025), Hungarians perceive Ukraine as one of the main threats — 27%, second only to Russia (33%).This is one of the most alarming consequences of Budapest’s current policy.

Ukraine has become one of the main targets of the Fidesz party’s election campaign. In this regard, we find ourselves in ‘good company’ – alongside the leadership of the European Union. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán regularly attacks European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, accusing Brussels of supporting Ukraine.