Kyiv Security Forum Analytics

The new Hungarian government, led by Péter Magyar, had barely taken office when the country’s policy began to shift. For Ukraine, this is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. A €90 billion reparations loan has been unblocked, the 20th package of EU sanctions has been approved, and the illegally seized funds of Oschadbank have been returned. Kyiv and Brussels have begun active consultations on the start of accession negotiations.

However, on the issue of negotiations, Magyar has taken a hard line – stating that he is prepared to support their commencement only on condition that the rights of the Hungarian minority are expanded. Unfortunately, this is not about European standards, nor about expectations regarding the resolution of all issues during the accession negotiations. Mádár’s demands largely echo the list of 11 requirements that former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán put forward to Kyiv in 2024. These relate in particular to education in the Hungarian language, political representation, and so on.

Many analysts had warned that Magyar’s policies might contain elements unpalatable to Kyiv and Brussels. However, few expected this to happen so quickly and on such a sensitive issue. All the more so as the discrepancies between Budapest’s policies and the European mainstream were one of the reasons for the blocking of significant funds for Hungary, which the new Prime Minister is seeking to obtain.

Brussels is hoping for Orbán’s pragmatism, whilst at the same time planning to put pressure on the new Hungarian government to resolve the Ukrainian issue as quickly as possible. The European Commission’s ‘cards’ are undoubtedly very strong. The possibility of unblocking €10.4 billion from the EU’s post-COVID fund is currently under discussion. The European Commission is prepared to discuss only the grant portion, which amounts to €6.5 billion. The Hungarians, however, are seeking to secure €3.9 billion in preferential loans as well. For Budapest, this is important not only from a financial but also from a political point of view.

Positive changes have taken place in relations with Bratislava. Following the resumption of operations on the Druzhba oil pipeline and the loss of a key political ally on the pro-Russian flank, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has lifted the block on all contentious issues. His meeting with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Yerevan on 4 May, during which Fico declared his support for Ukraine’s EU membership, cemented this positive trend.

On the other hand, the victory of Rumen Radev, who is considered a pro-Russian politician, in the parliamentary elections in Bulgaria on 19 April and his appointment as Prime Minister points to the possible emergence of a new risk factor for both Ukraine and Brussels. This is suggested by Radev’s vague statements regarding the ownership of Crimea and the status of Russian dictator Putin as an aggressor, the advisability of continuing to purchase energy resources from Russia, and his reluctance to supply weapons to Ukraine, which, in his view, prolongs the war.

At the same time, in Bulgaria itself, people are pinning their hopes on Radev’s pragmatism, comparing him to Fico rather than Orbán. This is justified not only by his character traits, which he has repeatedly demonstrated during his nine-year presidency, but also by the mood among the Bulgarian population. According to a poll conducted by Alpha Research at the start of the year, 56% of Bulgarians see Europe as a strategic partner, and only 19% see Russia as such.