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An attack by the US and Israel on Iran won't cause oil prices to shoot up for long – Iranian oil supplies are pretty much tied to China, which, even in the worst-case scenario, will be able to partly replace them with alternative suppliers.These could include, for example, OPEC+ countries, whose total quota in 2025 has increased by almost 2.9 million barrels per day. For comparison, oil supplies from Iran to China, according to various estimates, amount to between 1.5 and 2 million barrels per day.In the medium to long term, the US operation in Iran will lead to prices stabilising at medium or relatively low levels – no more than $60 per barrel.The reasons are as follows:<ul><li>on the one hand, a temporary jump in prices will create a favourable backdrop for an increase in OPEC+ quotas, which has been put on hold until the first quarter of 2026; &nbsp;</li><li>if the bombing forces Iran to reach an agreement with the US, the oil embargo on Iran will likely be lifted, and the Iranian oil industry will gain access to the services of international oil service companies.</li></ul>In both cases, the bombing of Iran will result in an increase in oil supply, which will help to ‘cool down’ the situation on the oil market.If the war in Iraq ushered in an era of high oil prices, then the US military operation in Iran could bring it to an end.

An attack by the US and Israel on Iran won't cause oil prices to shoot up for long – Iranian oil supplies are pretty much tied to China, which, even in the worst-case scenario, will be able to partly replace them with alternative suppliers.

Vyacheslav BUTKO 

What the bombing of Iran means for the oil market

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsThe US National Defense Strategy, published on January 24, did not bring any strategic innovations. Like the National Security Strategy released in November 2025, it is fully subordinated to the current administration's ‘America First’ policy.The key US defence priorities are as follows:• &nbsp; &nbsp;defence of the United States' territory on land and at sea, in particular strengthening air defence through the deployment of the Golden Dome system, anti-drone protection, and safeguarding US interests in the Western Hemisphere; • &nbsp; &nbsp;containing China in the Indo-Pacific region not through direct confrontation, but through a demonstration of power and the maintenance of a balance that prevents Beijing from dominating the US and its allies; • &nbsp; &nbsp;increasing allies' and partners' responsibility for their own defence, with a gradual shift away from their former dependence on Washington, both in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific region; • &nbsp; &nbsp;‘recharging’ the American defence industry, in particular by returning strategic production to the US, reinvesting, supporting innovation and new technologies, including artificial intelligence, and removing outdated regulatory restrictions.Russia, Iran and North Korea are not considered separate strategic defence priorities. Threats from these countries are mentioned, but in a rather narrow and selective manner.It is noted that Russia will remain a constant but manageable threat to NATO's eastern members in the foreseeable future. At the same time, the intensification of aggressive tendencies in Moscow's policy in the context of the war against Ukraine is not directly recorded. The main emphasis is placed on the demographic and economic problems of the Russian Federation, as well as on the remaining reserves of its military and industrial potential.The list of threats to the United States includes Russia's nuclear arsenal, its submarine, space and cyber capabilities. It is assumed that the Ministry of Defence will focus primarily on countering these challenges, while continuing to play a vital role within NATO.It is separately emphasised that European allies should take primary responsibility for their own conventional defence, while the US will focus on China and the Western Hemisphere. This division of roles is justified not only by the ‘America First’ policy, but also by Europe's significantly higher combined economic and military potential compared to Russia, which, according to the authors of the document, makes Moscow's hegemony on the continent impossible.As in the National Security Strategy, Russia's aggression against Ukraine is not directly condemned. The authors limit themselves to stating that, as a result of the war, relations between European states and the Russian Federation have significantly weakened, and their normalisation will require active diplomatic involvement from the US.Washington's efforts to achieve peace in Ukraine are mentioned in the document, but the key role in ensuring the defence of our state is assigned to European partners. The strategy contains no hints of the possibility of providing even limited security guarantees to Ukraine from the United States.Thus, although the Defence Strategy, unlike the National Security Strategy, at least acknowledges the threats from Moscow, there has been no fundamental shift in the US administration's view of its role in ensuring European security.

The US National Defense Strategy, published on January 24, did not bring any strategic innovations. Like the National Security Strategy released in November 2025, it is fully subordinated to the current administration's ‘America First’ policy.

The New US National Defence Strategy: Old Priorities of the ‘America First’ Concept

This year, Ukraine is planning to produce seven million drones. Meanwhile, in the US, the so-called ‘arsenal of democracy’, we only produce 300,000 per year.Excerpt from the speech by General David Petraeus, Member of the KSF Security Council, Commander of U.S. Central Command (2008–2010), Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (2011–2012), at a Special Session of the KSF ‘12 Years of War. What Next?’, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://nv.ua/ukr/opinion/general-petreus-ukrajina-posilyuye-tisk-na-rosiyu-zbilshuye-virobnictvo-droniv-50581854.html">published </a>on the NV website.First of all, I would like to express my respect not only for the Ukrainian military, whom I greatly admire, but also for the Ukrainian people, the people of Ukraine. We are well aware of the hardships they are going through. Two days ago, I visited one of the units that specialises in drones. It was freezing cold there, the kind of cold that chills you deep down to your bones. I don't think I've experienced such cold weather since my days at military school in Georgia. What the Ukrainians have done, how they show their resilience and creativity, is truly impressive.This is my ninth visit to Ukraine since 2022.We met with Mr. Syrsky and with his deputies separately. We also visited the drone unit. We were at the newly established drone control centre. That is also extremely impressive. I also spoke with the head of DTEK, who told me about the enormous problems Ukraine is facing due to the shelling of its power grids and what is being done to restore them... We met with the Third Corps at the Zmiinyi Island Institute.We are observing how the situation changes every month. For me, as an old soldier, it is a great joy to see the creative approach that Ukrainians are taking.I agree with The Wall Street Journal — Putin will not win.I truly believe that this is the case. Ukraine, which has no military navy, has managed to force the Russian fleet into hiding, and most of this fleet has been destroyed. How was this achieved? Through ingenuity. And through intelligence, of course. They found out where the ships were, determined their location, and sank them. Even the flagship Moskva was sunk. It was an extraordinary sight.Ukraine is increasingly bringing the war to Russian territory, to critical military infrastructure and oil refineries. We are seeing the use of Flamingo cruise missiles, which have a longer range than their American counterparts — 3,000 km — and a larger warhead. This is another example of how Ukraine's industrial power is being realised. And it will cause enormous damage to Russia. I can say the same about Ukraine's shorter-range weapons — production is scaling up.We are following the negotiations. Their outcome is predictable.Ukraine is showing the willingness and skills to reach a compromise, but at the same time not to violate its Constitution and not to cross certain red lines in terms of territory exchange. I think that ultimately the United States will understand that Putin has no intention of agreeing to a ceasefire with Ukraine. It is very important that our European friends play a key role in developing security measures and guarantees for Ukraine. And that the United States is involved in this in terms of monitoring and confirming violations, if any.Medvedev, Putin and others continue to insist on their basic demands, primarily the demilitarisation of Ukraine, demanding that they be given land and fortified cities that they have been unable to capture for such a long time. I think they would be happy to see President Zelensky replaced by some pro-Russian figure.And I am sure that this is a miscalculation on their part.But right now, there is a unique opportunity.Russia has become much more vulnerable economically and socially. Their ‘national welfare fund’ will run out this year. India is going to buy much less oil and gas from them. The European Union has set a price cap. This means that they are receiving much less income and are doing enormous damage to their economy.There are no loan-based investments in Russia. The inflation rate is very high. They are now in a extremely difficult situation. And all this is happening in the midst of negotiations.We are all aware that Putin is not taking this seriously. Therefore, the US needs to re-approve the sanctions supported by Senator Lindsey Graham and more than 100 other senators. The European Union is also currently considering a 20th round of sanctions. It has approved a €90 billion support package for Ukraine. This changes the situation significantly. At the very least, it will help Ukraine improve its economic and financial situation, in particular by doubling the production of important drones. And I do not rule out that this will also begin to convince Putin that he may suffer more than Ukrainians, Europeans and Americans.Ukraine plans to produce 7 million drones. The US needs to learn from this.Of course, we need to provide Ukraine with much more, for example, in terms of air defence and ballistic missile defence. This is very difficult to do, but Ukraine needs it. This year, Ukraine may produce 7 million drones, somewhere between 9,000 and 10,000 per day. And here in the United States, in the arsenal of democracy, we have 300,000 per year.They change the software almost every week and the hardware every few weeks. There has never been a procurement system like this before.We all need to recognise and understand what is happening here. We need to revise our approaches, our practices, and change our organisational structure. Because Ukraine already has unmanned systems forces and cyber forces. And we need to prepare and train our leaders. We need to procure materials. And many other things. We are not doing this quickly enough. We must learn from the experience of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.In fact, Ukraine is now developing tomorrow's technology for today's war. And in our case, in the United States, the process is taking too long, which ultimately leads to yesterday's technology being developed for tomorrow's war. So what you are doing now is a unique opportunity, given the great vulnerability of the Russian economy and the strong support of the European Union.We must take additional measures to help Ukraine stop the Russians on the front lines and counter missiles and swarms of drones. We must inflict even greater damage on the Russian economy, including sanctions, including secondary sanctions against countries that supply components to the Russian armed forces. China alone supplies a huge number of components, chips and motors to the Russian military-industrial complex.What comes next?You won't believe it, but I am also a former economics teacher. Of course, the answer to every question like this begins with the words: it depends…In this case, the answer should be formulated roughly as follows: it largely depends on how Europe continues to support Ukraine. If there is a 20th package of sanctions from Europe, if the US is able to impose the draconian sanctions proposed by Senator Graham, this will determine the situation for the future:will we be able to crush Russia's military economy,will we be able to cut off oil revenues,will we be able to deprive Russia of foreign components for weapons.Russia has already lost more than 1.2 million killed and wounded. That is more than the United States lost during the entire Second World War. Look at it in context. Yes, they do have a large country, but such levels of loss are unacceptable for any country.Providing Ukraine with long-range weapons, helping to produce weapons such as Flamingo to inflict serious damage on Russia's energy networks, oil refineries, etc. If these steps are taken and the Ukrainian military continues to approach its work with the same innovative approach it has demonstrated up to now, I believe that with the depletion of the ‘national welfare fund,’ Putin will be forced to engage in genuine negotiations to end the war.The more we do to bring that day closer, the better.For Ukraine, for its people, and for its army. &nbsp;

This year, Ukraine is planning to produce seven million drones. Meanwhile, in the US, the so-called ‘arsenal of democracy’, we only produce 300,000 per year.

Excerpt from the speech by General David Petraeus, Member of the KSF Security Council, Commander of U.S. Central Command (2008–2010), Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (2011–2012), at a Special Session of the KSF ‘12 Years of War. What Next?’, published on the NV website.

‘Ukrainians, I am impressed. This is where Putin will miscalculate.’ From General Petraeus’ speech at a KSF Special Session

Let’s face it, things are changing. This last year taught us that Europeans need to invest more in hard powerFrom the speech by British Ambassador to Ukraine Neil Crompton at a KSF Special Session, ‘Twelve Years of War. What Next?’, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://nv.ua/ukr/opinion/bezpeka-ukrajini-ta-yevropi-posol-nil-krompton-pro-strategichni-vikliki-viyni-50582044.html">published</a> on the NV website.I was in Washington when Republican Senator John McCain was running for office. Back then, he said: ‘When I looked into Putin's eyes, I saw three letters — KGB.’In the United Kingdom, we believe that Putin will only be able to talk about peace in earnest when we put significantly more pressure on him. First and foremost, we must increase economic pressure on Russia through sanctions.We must take a more creative and unconventional approach to this issue in order to weaken Russia's strategic position.I am struck by the figures we have received recently, particularly regarding the losses of the Russian army. The Russians are spending billions on disinformation, on shaping their narrative that Ukraine's defeat is inevitable. But they have not been particularly successful. A striking example: when President Zelenskyy was in Kupiansk, just a few kilometres away from the front line, Putin met with Gerasimov in a bunker.Our strategy should be designed to demonstrate Ukraine's power, determination and resilience. With the support of the United States and Europe, we will be able to reach a position where Russia will face such problems internally that it will be in Russia's own interests to negotiate an end to the war.This past year has taught us that Europeans need to invest more in hard power, gain more strategic autonomy, and cultivate more productive partnerships.We must acknowledge that things are changing, and President Trump is adopting a new approach in his dealings with us. But every American president since John F. Kennedy — including Barack Obama — has said that we need to spend more on defence. The US is seeking a balance between Europe and East, and we are responding rather slowly to this.Europe is finally recognising that we need to take more responsibility for our own security.This is a matter of political awareness: Ukrainian security and our security are inseparable today. NATO members in Europe have increased their defence investments by 50% compared to the past. I can say that these are epoch-making political changes.So, undoubtedly, we need to maintain our relationship with the United States. We feel stronger because of this. But I think it is high time for us to invest even more in our defence expenditures, in strengthening our military-industrial complex capabilities. We need to coordinate our efforts with the Baltic states and France, at least in terms of security guarantees.I think Europe is finally responding to what a number of American presidents have been saying.We are openly looking at the risk posed by Russia. London says that we need to have the most modern nuclear deterrent system. We are modernising our submarines. We are discussing tactical weapons with our French friends. What happened in 2022 redirected Britain's strategic thinking and the restoration of our nuclear deterrent capability.We diplomats believe in solutions through negotiation. But we all understand your lesson from Budapest and the Minsk process: in order to achieve peace, you must be 100% sure that Russia will not attack again. And if it does attack, it will be met with a fitting response.Everyone understands this in my country's capital and in other European capital cities.

Let’s face it, things are changing. This last year taught us that Europeans need to invest more in hard power. From the speech by British Ambassador to Ukraine Neil Crompton at a KSF Special Session, ‘Twelve Years of War. What Next?’, published on the NV website.

“In Putin’s eyes, there are only three letters – KGB.” Excerpt from the speech by the British Ambassador to Ukraine at a KSF Special Session

<img src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/00000_2a777ae43f.jpeg" alt="00000.jpeg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_00000_2a777ae43f.jpeg 219w,https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_00000_2a777ae43f.jpeg 500w,https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_00000_2a777ae43f.jpeg 750w," sizes="100vw" width="750px">The sociological survey ‘Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country, vision of ways to solve security problems’ was conducted by the Razumkov Centre's sociological service on behalf of the Kyiv Security Forum from 31 January to 4 February 2026 using telephone interviews.&nbsp;A total of 1,003 respondents aged 18 and older living in all regions of Ukraine (except for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) were interviewed. The survey was conducted with citizens who, at the time of the survey, were located in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine and covered by the telephone networks of Ukrainian telephone operators.The structure of the sample population reflects the demographic structure of the adult population of the territories where the survey was conducted as of the beginning of 2022 (by macro-regions, age, gender, type of settlement).The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 3.2%. In the analysis, the results of this study are compared with the results of other studies conducted by the Razumkov Centre's sociological service.Key findings of the study• &nbsp; &nbsp;Ukrainians have a very high level of trust in the institutions directly responsible for the country's defence (the Armed Forces, the National Guard, the State Border Service, the Main Intelligence Directorate, and the Security Service of Ukraine), and this high level of trust has been maintained over the last three years.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The majority of respondents trust the President of Ukraine, which is partly due to his role as Commander-in-Chief.• &nbsp; &nbsp;More Ukrainians distrust the NABU, the police, the prosecutor's office, the judicial system, the government and the Verkhovna Rada than trust them. Over the past six months, the level of trust in the NABU and the judicial system has increased, while the level of trust in the police and the Verkhovna Rada has decreased.• &nbsp; &nbsp;Ukrainians have a positive attitude towards countries that consistently support Ukraine. Recently, the level of positive attitudes towards the United Kingdom and Canada has increased. Positive attitudes towards France, Germany and the EU have remained consistently high.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The majority of respondents express positive attitudes towards the US, although this share has decreased significantly over the past six months.• &nbsp; &nbsp;Negative attitudes towards China have decreased, although they remain very high (two-thirds of respondents express negative attitudes towards China).• &nbsp; &nbsp;The already extremely negative attitude towards Russia has worsened.• &nbsp; &nbsp;Almost three-quarters of respondents express a positive attitude towards NATO, but this figure has deteriorated over the past six months. &nbsp;However, support for Ukraine's accession to NATO has not declined and remains consistently high (71%).• &nbsp; &nbsp;Support for Ukraine's accession to the EU is even higher (83%).• &nbsp; &nbsp;84% of Ukrainians believe in Ukraine's victory in the war with Russia. This figure has increased significantly compared to 2025.• &nbsp; &nbsp;There is no consensus among Ukrainians on the minimum conditions necessary for concluding a peace agreement with Russia, but only 7% of respondents are willing to cede territories (in Donbas and southern Ukraine) currently controlled by Ukraine for the sake of peace.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The vast majority of respondents believe that in order to sign a peace agreement with Russia, it is impossible to compromise on real security guarantees, assistance in Ukraine's economic recovery, reparations from Russia in favour of Ukraine, control over Donbas, and Russia's responsibility for war crimes. A relative majority of respondents believe that Ukraine's course towards EU and NATO membership should not be compromised.•⁠ &nbsp;⁠Only a third of respondents believe that the Ukrainian government is successfully negotiating with the US, EU and Russia on a possible peace agreement.•⁠ &nbsp;⁠Three-quarters of respondents believe that if a peace agreement is signed between Ukraine and Russia, Russia will violate the agreement and attack Ukraine as soon as it suits them. This number has increased significantly compared to May and September 2025.• &nbsp;More than two-thirds of respondents are convinced that even if Ukraine withdraws its troops from the entire Donbas region, Russia will continue its aggression.•⁠ &nbsp;⁠As was the case six months ago, two-thirds of respondents believe that Russia is planning to attack one of the NATO countries.&nbsp; However, during this time, the proportion of those who believe that it definitely intends to do so has decreased, while the proportion of those who believe that it may intend to attack has increased.•⁠ &nbsp;⁠The vast majority of respondents believe that NATO is capable of effectively defending itself in the event of an attack by Russia.•⁠ &nbsp;⁠Three-quarters of respondents reported poor energy supply during the week before the survey, more than a third reported poor heating, and another 1-2% of respondents had no heating or energy supply at all. 60% of respondents had no problems with heating, and a quarter had no problems with energy supply.•⁠ &nbsp;⁠The vast majority of Ukrainians blame Russian troops for the prolonged disruption of electricity, water and heat supplies. However, at the same time, almost half of those surveyed also blame local authorities, which is significantly more than in December 2022.&nbsp;• &nbsp;Three-quarters of those surveyed said that their town or village had been affected by Russian attacks, and 8% said that they or their families had suffered physical or material damage as a result of Russian attacks.•⁠ &nbsp;⁠A relative majority of respondents believe that Ukraine should respond in kind to Russian attacks on critical infrastructure. More than a third of respondents believe that Ukraine should intensify its attacks on Russian critical infrastructure, and only 5% agree to accept all of Russia's conditions in order to end the war.The results of the sociological survey can be found here:<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Res0126tel1000_ENG_11_bez_numeracziyi_e643154057.pdf">Results of the sociological survey</a><a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/dyn0226_ENG_11_5849c9ebd5.pdf">Dynamics of the sociological survey</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

The sociological survey ‘Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country, vision of ways to solve security problems’ was conducted by the Razumkov Centre's sociological service on behalf of the Kyiv Security Forum from 31 January to 4 February 2026 using telephone interviews. 

Results of a sociological survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre and commissioned by the Kyiv Security Forum


The Kyiv Security Forum co-organised an event at the Munich Security Conference for the first time, making energy security its key topic. The discussion ‘Energy Warfare: How to Unplug Tyranny’ brought together Ukrainian and international politicians, diplomats, experts and energy market leaders.<o:p></o:p>The context of the conversation is crucial: the energy situation in Ukraine is extremely difficult due to continuous Russian attacks. Since the beginning of 2026 alone, there have been 217 attacks on energy facilities, and during Russia's full-scale invasion, more than a thousand strikes have been carried out on Ukraine's energy system.<o:p></o:p>The massive strikes have led to regular large-scale power outages. The blackouts lasted 10-20 hours during the winter of 2022-2023 and 10-16 hours per day during peak periods in 2024-2025. However, these restrictions do not seem as severe as those experienced in January-February 2026.<o:p></o:p>Since the beginning of this year, more people have been leaving the country precisely because of the lack of stable electricity, heating and water. Some cities were temporarily left without water supply due to the power outages at pumping stations.According to the National Bank's forecasts, the destruction of the energy system will significantly slow down economic growth in 2026.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p>Energy genocide in figures<o:p></o:p>Chairman of the Kyiv&nbsp; Security Forum, Prime Minister of Ukraine in 2014-2016, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, began the discussion with <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" href="https://ksf.openukraine.org/en/categories/news/tri-chverti-ukrayinciv-mayut-problemi-z-elektropostachannyam-ta-opalennyam">shocking data</a> from a sociological study commissioned by the KSF: about 40% of Ukrainians have problems with heating in the midst of frosts, and 74% face unstable electricity supply.<img alt="WhatsApp Image 2026-02-14 at 19.35.19 (1).jpeg" src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1_750bc96d6d.jpeg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1_750bc96d6d.jpeg 235w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1_750bc96d6d.jpeg 500w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1_750bc96d6d.jpeg 750w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/large_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1_750bc96d6d.jpeg 1000w" sizes="100vw" width="1000"><o:p></o:p>The vast majority of Ukrainians (almost 80%) blame Russian troops for the prolonged disruption of electricity, water and heat supplies. At the same time, almost half of those surveyed blame local authorities (three times more than in December 2022). One in five respondents points to the responsibility of private and municipal service providers, while 17% blame the President and the Ukrainian government. The proportion of those who blame Western countries for insufficient assistance has fallen sharply over three years, from 25% to 4.3%. Ukrainians appreciate the help of their partners, in particular in the form of transformers and generators, which are coming to the aid of Ukrainian energy companies.<o:p></o:p><o:p></o:p>‘This is a war of attrition. What energy companies are doing is truly impressive — their work is heroic. But we must prepare for next winter. And only God knows how many more winters like this lie ahead,’ emphasised Arseniy Yatsenyuk.<o:p></o:p>Survival formula: air defence, finance and equipment<o:p></o:p>DTEK CEO Maksym Timchenko confirmed the complexity of the situation and explained what is needed to find a systematic solution to the issue.<o:p></o:p>According to Timchenko, the main priority at the moment is to protect the remaining energy facilities. Ukraine urgently needs interceptor missiles for air defence and powerful portable generators. Although Ukraine has the necessary launchers, there is an acute shortage of interceptor missiles. The CEO of DTEK explained that the existing counter-drone systems effectively cover the facilities, but they are not capable of repelling massive attacks.<img alt="WhatsApp Image 2026-02-14 at 19.35.18.jpeg" src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_18_8da671378b.jpeg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_18_8da671378b.jpeg 235w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_18_8da671378b.jpeg 500w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_18_8da671378b.jpeg 750w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/large_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_18_8da671378b.jpeg 1000w" sizes="100vw" width="1000"><o:p></o:p>Apart from air defence, the energy system needs support to increase electricity production. The supply of large mobile generators that can be connected to powerless apartment buildings will allow critical systems to be restored and buildings to remain functional.<o:p></o:p>Alongside international aid, DTEK specialists are sourcing used transformers and other equipment in European countries that can be adapted for the company's Ukrainian power plants.<o:p></o:p>According to Timchenko, these measures are critical for Ukraine to withstand Russia's pressure and survive the energy war.<o:p></o:p>He revealed that the restoration budget for DTEK's own power generation facilities alone would require €300 million, half of which the company has already covered with its own resources. Another €150 million is needed to restore 4,000 MW of capacity, which will be sufficient to get through the next heating season.<o:p></o:p>To stabilise the system for the next winter, energy experts have set a cut-off date of May. Equipment orders must be placed by then, as the supply cycle takes at least 10 months.<o:p></o:p>Oleksiy Ryabchyn, Director of International and Sustainable Development at Naftogaz Group, emphasised that in the context of the rejection of Russian energy resources, every energy facility on the European continent becomes a geopolitical target for Russia: ‘That is why we are here in Munich and at other venues communicating with our partners and holding joint consultations on how to counter the Russian threat. Because now energy companies are not only producers but also defenders of energy.<img alt="WhatsApp Image 2026-02-14 at 19.35.16.jpeg" src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_02c3364cde.jpeg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_02c3364cde.jpeg 235w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_02c3364cde.jpeg 500w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_02c3364cde.jpeg 750w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/large_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_02c3364cde.jpeg 1000w" sizes="100vw" width="1000"><o:p></o:p>The Naftogaz representative emphasised the importance of international partner's support: "On the one hand, we are mobilising resources — attracting grant funding, preferential loans, international support and financing for the restoration of destroyed equipment. Naftogaz is cooperating with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank, the governments of the United States, Norway and various EU and G7 countries to raise funds for gas purchases to compensate for volumes that have been destroyed or lost. On the other hand, we are simultaneously pursuing an equally important business track regarding projects and attracting investments in joint projects with our foreign partners.<o:p></o:p>Ryabchyn noted that Russia has damaged a significant amount of extremely expensive equipment — compressor stations, gas turbines, oil and gas and power infrastructure. The strikes are carried out not only with drones and missiles, but also with artillery. It is impossible to quickly restore the equipment due to the scale of the destruction.<o:p></o:p>‘It takes at least 12 months to manufacture new equipment, yet it is needed urgently. Furthermore, the involvement of foreign technical specialists, who are required to provide engineering supervision and support for the implementation of such projects, poses a challenge,’ stated Oleksiy Ryabchyn.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p>According to him, Naftogaz has already begun preparing for the next heating season, which, if Russian shelling continues, may also be difficult, especially given the limited operation of the power system.<o:p></o:p>The decentralisation strategy: Khrushchevkas with autonomous heating<o:p></o:p>Former Naftogaz CEO Andriy Kobolev has called for an end to any attempts to revive the Soviet model of large thermal power plants, which are ideal military targets. Instead, he suggests a path to diversification – a transition to small, autonomous generating capacities.<figure class="image"><img alt="WhatsApp Image 2026-02-14 at 19.35.16 (1).jpeg" src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_1_fc3c5008da.jpeg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_1_fc3c5008da.jpeg 235w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_1_fc3c5008da.jpeg 500w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_1_fc3c5008da.jpeg 750w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/large_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_16_1_fc3c5008da.jpeg 1000w" sizes="100vw" width="1000"></figure>"If we take about 5,000 old Soviet Khrushchevkas (apartment buildings which were designed and constructed in the Soviet Union from the early 1960s onwards, when their namesake, Nikita Khrushchev, was leader of the Soviet Union –&nbsp;ed.) in Kyiv and convert them to autonomous systems, the cost of the project will be about €1.5 billion. This is cheaper than anti-aircraft defence and much more sustainable. If you have your own system, you control it," Kobolev explained.<o:p></o:p>He added that attracting private investors is possible even during wartime through military risk insurance mechanisms (DFC).<o:p></o:p>Military response: long-range capabilities as a means of deterrence<o:p></o:p>The participants agreed that it is impossible to defend oneself forever. Former US Special Representative for Ukraine Kurt Volker believes that Western leaders must provide the means to prevent attacks.<o:p></o:p>"Air defence is a necessary temporary measure.&nbsp;It is needed when other mechanisms do not work. But we must focus on preventing attacks. This is a combination of long-range weapons that can destroy rocket fuel manufacturing facilities, rocket and drone production plants, and airfields from which they are launched," Volker emphasised.<o:p></o:p>Former CIA Director and Member of the KSF Security Council, General David Petraeus, noted that Ukraine is already demonstrating incredible capabilities in the production of long-range weapons.<img alt="WhatsApp Image 2026-02-14 at 19.35.17.jpeg" src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_17_60986817b4.jpeg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_17_60986817b4.jpeg 235w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_17_60986817b4.jpeg 500w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_17_60986817b4.jpeg 750w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/large_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_17_60986817b4.jpeg 1000w" sizes="100vw" width="1000"><o:p></o:p>"The Flamingo cruise missile has a range of about 3,000 kilometres. That's a tremendous range.&nbsp;When it goes into serial production, it will be more effective than most of the possible supplies from the West," Petraeus noted.<o:p></o:p>Economic pressure and sanctions<o:p></o:p>Volker also stressed that in order to achieve a truce, pressure on Russia, primarily economic pressure, must be significantly stronger.<o:p></o:p>The head of the Permanent Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security, Defence and Intelligence, Yegor Cherniev, agreed with him and stressed that the energy war must also be waged in the economic sphere.<img alt="WhatsApp Image 2026-02-14 at 19.35.15.jpeg" src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_15_7514c8caf6.jpeg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_15_7514c8caf6.jpeg 235w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_15_7514c8caf6.jpeg 500w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_15_7514c8caf6.jpeg 750w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/large_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_15_7514c8caf6.jpeg 1000w" sizes="100vw" width="1000"><o:p></o:p>He noted that Russia is constantly changing its tactics and varying the trajectories of ballistic missiles. According to intelligence reports, there are no signs that Russia is willing to stop.<o:p></o:p>“On the contrary, their production is increasing and is aimed at increasing the volume and diversity of weapons – ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as drones. What we need now is to destroy their military potential. The second key point is to destroy their economy with sanctions. And this applies to their sources of budget revenue. Sanctions since 2022 have helped to reduce the potential of the Russian army. At the same time, the potential for new sanctions in the oil and gas, energy and related sectors remains significant. I am convinced that it is cheaper for our partners to restrict Russia's sources of income than to constantly spend money on air defence systems," emphasised Yegor Cherniev.<o:p></o:p>Joint Action Plan<o:p></o:p>Following the roundtable discussion, Arseniy Yatsenyuk initiated the preparation of a joint letter to the European Commission and the governments of EU countries.<img alt="WhatsApp Image 2026-02-14 at 19.35.19.jpeg" src="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1dfef843bf.jpeg" srcset="https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/thumbnail_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1dfef843bf.jpeg 235w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/small_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1dfef843bf.jpeg 500w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/medium_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1dfef843bf.jpeg 750w, https://ksf-openukraine.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/large_Whats_App_Image_2026_02_14_at_19_35_19_1dfef843bf.jpeg 1000w" sizes="100vw" width="1000"><o:p></o:p>This document will send a clear signal about the specific technologies, resources and financial instruments that the Ukrainian energy sector needs today.<o:p></o:p>The next stage of discussions is scheduled for the end of April in Kyiv, where a concrete action plan for the protection and modernisation of the Ukrainian energy sector will be presented.<o:p></o:p>The Kyiv Security Forum was founded in 2007 on the initiative of Arseniy Yatsenyuk. The Munich Security Conference is the most influential international forum for discussing global security issues.<o:p></o:p>

How to unplug tyranny and survive next winter: conclusions of the Kyiv Security Forum discussion at a joint event in Munich

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsDespite Washington's optimistic statements about the agreement on 90% of the peace plan and the constructive nature of the latest rounds of peace talks in Abu Dhabi, recent statements by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, his deputy Grushko, and Putin's press secretary Peskov regarding the preconditions for a ceasefire sounded discordant.Apparently, the problematic aspects are not only of a territorial nature. The Russian side emphasises the need to provide ‘security guarantees’ not only to Ukraine but also to Russia. At the same time, the Russian side sees these guarantees in the context of ensuring the most favourable conditions for future aggression. How else can one interpret the demands to prohibit Ukraine's membership in NATO, the deployment of NATO troops on the territory of our state, and the cessation of its use to ‘create threats’ to Russia? And this is coming from the aggressor state!Moreover, Russia has already begun to put forward additional and obviously unacceptable demands on territorial issues, in particular regarding the recognition of the Russian status of the occupied territories.More recently, Lavrov went even further in his territorial claims. In a speech to the Russian diplomatic corps, he stressed that ‘the people of Crimea, Donbas and Novorossiya have expressed their will in referendums, and [Russia] will see through the process of returning these “historically Russian” lands to their “native harbour”.’ And everyone knows where the borders of the ‘ancient Russian’ lands lie – wherever Russian soldiers can reach.Lavrov also questioned Moscow's willingness to compromise on the issue of the rights of so-called ‘Russian speakers.’ According to him, ‘the linguistic, cultural and religious rights of those who remain under the authority of Kyiv must be restored.’Russian officials also emphasise that success in the negotiations can only be achieved if the positions agreed upon at the meeting between the American and Russian leaders in Anchorage are adhered to. At the same time, the content of these supposedly reached agreements is not disclosed. However, disappointment is expressed that the American side is moving away from them.Given how the meeting in Anchorage ended – with a demonstratively shortened press conference and the cancellation of a friendly lunch – there are serious doubts about the parties' common understanding of the results of this event. This is not to mention the status that any talks between the US and Russian presidents about Ukraine can have without taking Ukraine's opinion into account.In this context, the ‘constructive’ peace negotiation process looks like a simple delaying tactic. Russia is doing this to avoid new sanctions. Ukraine is forced to play along in order to protect itself from a new suspension of US military support, in particular the transfer of intelligence and the sale of weapons.US President Trump has so far rejected all proposals to increase pressure on Moscow to bring it to its senses, even when they come from his political allies. At the same time, the White House is seeking to achieve some kind of result as quickly as possible and is insisting on a territorial compromise on the Ukrainian side, ignoring the inconsistencies in the Russian side's agreement on other aspects of the peace plan that are included in the aforementioned 90%.But such a flimsy structure of artificial ‘peace agreements’ is bound to collapse.New sanctions on Russia would not only be a more effective tool for achieving a truce, but would also increase the level of support for Republicans in American society. After all, there is still a prevailing demand for support for Ukraine.

Despite Washington's optimistic statements about the agreement on 90% of the peace plan and the constructive nature of the latest rounds of peace talks in Abu Dhabi, recent statements by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, his deputy Grushko, and Putin's press secretary Peskov regarding the preconditions for a ceasefire sounded discordant.

Progress in peace talks with Russia

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsOn February 28, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale operation against Iran. Strikes were carried out on Tehran (including the area of the presidential palace and the National Security Council), as well as on Isfahan, Karaj and other centres of military and nuclear infrastructure.The key issues are not limited to the nuclear programme. Reportedly, senior Iranian leadership may have been killed or injured. If this is confirmed, it will no longer be a question of ‘containment’ but of the potential collapse of the regime.The reason for the operation was the de facto failure of negotiations: Tehran has refused to transfer highly enriched uranium abroad, accept permanent restrictions and dismantle its nuclear infrastructure.&nbsp; Negotiations on the missile programme and support for proxy forces were also rejected. US President Donald Trump said that Iran had resumed its pursuit of nuclear weapons and called on the Iranian people to overthrow the regime after the operation was completed.Iran responded with strikes on Israel and American bases in the region. The Persian Gulf found itself in a zone of direct military escalation. Europe called for restraint. Russia sided with Tehran.Will this bring peace closer for Ukraine?If the regime in Tehran weakens or falls, it will be a blow to the Russia-Iran-China axis. Iran is an important supplier of resources and technology for the Russian war. Its destabilisation means a weakening of the Kremlin and a reduction in its negotiating power.Thus, a possible temporary rise in oil prices could give Russia a short-term financial boost. But strategically, the fall or deep weakening of the Iranian regime would mean the weakening of the entire authoritarian bloc.Therefore, the decisive factor will not be the scale of the strikes, but the answer to one question: is a political breakdown beginning in Iran, and with it a strategic weakening of the anti-Western coalition?

On February 28, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale operation against Iran. Strikes were carried out on Tehran (including the area of the presidential palace and the National Security Council), as well as on Isfahan, Karaj and other centres of military and nuclear infrastructure.

Strike on Iran: the beginning of dismantling the authoritarian axis?

Kyiv Security Forum AnalyticsThe military operation by the United States and Israel against Iran is increasingly showing signs of dragging on. While its duration was initially expected to be a matter of days, then weeks, observers are now referring to internal Pentagon estimates that suggest it could last for months. Interim elections to the US Congress are effectively becoming the political horizon for this campaign. At the same time, the question arises: will Washington be able to continue to fully control the dynamics of the conflict?At the same time, the strategic objectives of the operation are becoming increasingly blurred. Initially, the goal was to eliminate Iran's nuclear and missile programmes and physically remove key political and military leaders of the regime. Now, however, a broader formula is increasingly being heard: the removal of the Ayatollahs' religious regime from power. However, the key moment for the implementation of such a scenario has probably been lost. The large-scale anti-government protests in Iran did not receive the external support that their participants had hoped for. Instead, Washington has begun a new round of negotiations with the Iranian leadership. In these circumstances, the opposition, weakened and fragmented, is unlikely to be ready for a new attempt at large-scale political action. Cooperation with Kurdish armed groups could be a possible tool for putting pressure on Tehran. However, even if a limited ground operation involving Kurdish forces were to be carried out, it would only result in a change of control over individual provinces. This is unlikely to lead to the fall of the central authority of the ayatollahs in Tehran.Calculations about an internal split in the regime's security forces also proved to be wrong. US President Donald Trump's calls for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to side with the opposition have no real basis. Moreover, some of the moderate Iranian politicians on whom Washington had been counting were killed in Israeli strikes on the government quarter, along with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Others, such as current President Masoud Pezeshkian, have no real influence on the key power structures of the state. It was also telling that Pezeshkian's promises to refrain from strikes on Arab countries were demonstratively ignored by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.At the same time, the initial military results of the campaign should not be underestimated. The US and Israel have managed to destroy a significant part of Iran's air defence systems, seriously weaken its navy, strike its missile infrastructure and partially paralyse the export capabilities of its oil sector. However, even under these conditions, it is extremely difficult to predict when the operation will end. Moreover, President Trump no longer rules out the possibility of a limited ground operation – for example, to seize enriched uranium stocks.The energy component is becoming one of the key implications of the conflict. Oil and gas prices are rising rapidly. The Strait of Hormuz remains formally open, but has effectively ceased to be used due to constant shelling. The US promises to guarantee the safety of shipping have not yet been fulfilled. China's calls for Tehran to resume transit, even if they have some impact, are unlikely to change the situation quickly.Additional pressure on global energy markets is being created by attacks on the oil and gas infrastructure of other countries in the region. Some facilities have been damaged, while others have been temporarily shut down for safety reasons.For Ukraine, the war around Iran has a double effect. On the one hand, the weakening of Tehran, Russia's key military and technological partner, has an obvious positive impact. The destruction of part of the missile and drone production facilities, as well as stocks of Shahed-type drones, directly affects Moscow's ability to continue the war against Ukraine.On the other hand, the conflict poses serious risks. First and foremost, there is a sharp rise in global energy prices, which directly increases Russian budget revenues and gives the Kremlin additional resources to rebuild its military potential. The shortage of air defence systems is also becoming a separate problem. Kyiv is already talking officially about a possible shortage of missiles for Patriot systems, and there is no quick solution to this problem in sight.Ukraine's cooperation with the US and Arab states in countering Iranian drones could strengthen our country's international image and increase interest in the Ukrainian experience. However, this does not solve the key problem – protection against Russian ballistic missiles.At the same time, the conflict complicates the prospects for peace talks with Russia. Even Washington's demonstrative unwillingness to exacerbate relations with Moscow over its intelligence support for Iran is unlikely to change the Kremlin's position.Europe is also among the main victims of the war in the Middle East. Rising energy prices and the risk of new migration flows are putting significant political pressure on European governments. This complicates the maintenance of transatlantic unity, especially against the backdrop of President Trump's harsh criticism of certain European allies who have expressed doubts about the advisability of an offensive operation against Iran.In these circumstances, it is critically important for Ukraine not only to ensure uninterrupted supplies of air defence systems, but also to seek to expand its long-range capabilities. Under current conditions, the destruction of the Russian military-industrial complex's production capabilities is becoming one of the key tools for deterring aggression – not only for Ukraine, but also for the security of Europe as a whole.

The military operation by the United States and Israel against Iran is increasingly showing signs of dragging on. While its duration was initially expected to be a matter of days, then weeks, observers are now referring to internal Pentagon estimates that suggest it could last for months. Interim elections to the US Congress are effectively becoming the political horizon for this campaign. At the same time, the question arises: will Washington be able to continue to fully control the dynamics of the conflict?

War in Iran: signs of a protracted operation and new geopolitical risks

Kyiv Security Forum Analytics• &nbsp; &nbsp;Hungary is entering a decisive phase of political struggle. Parliamentary elections will be held on 12 April, and for the first time in many years, there is a real prospect that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has ruled the country since 2010, will lose power.• &nbsp; &nbsp;For the first time, the opposition has a significant lead over the ruling party. According to a poll by Zavecz Research (22–28 February) among voters who have made up their minds, 50% support the Tisza party and 38% support Fidesz. Among all voters, the figures are 38% against 32%. About 20% are still uncertain.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The new leader in Hungarian politics is Péter Magyar, a former ally of Orbán. He heads the Tisza party and is campaigning under the slogans of fighting corruption, unblocking EU funds and returning Hungary to the European mainstream.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The elections are effectively turning into a referendum on the geopolitical course: continued confrontation with the EU and semi-isolation, or a return to democratic Europe and strengthening the country's role in the EU and NATO.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The economic situation is weakening the government's position: GDP growth is less than 1%, the budget deficit is over 4%, industrial production is falling and prices are rising. More than €19 billion in EU funds remain blocked due to problems with the rule of law and corruption.• &nbsp; &nbsp;Orbán has made conflict with Brussels and Kyiv part of his political strategy. His government is blocking new sanctions against Russia, slowing down negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU and opposing a large financial aid package for Ukraine.• &nbsp; &nbsp;Anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become one of the key themes of Fidesz's election campaign. Orbán is spreading narratives about an alleged ‘Ukrainian threat’ to Hungary's energy system and sharply criticising Kyiv, while barely reacting to Moscow's actions.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The detention of Ukrainian cash collectors by Hungarian law enforcement agencies caused a scandal. This involved the stopping and detention of cash collection vehicles belonging to a Ukrainian bank during a regular currency transport operation. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs rightly called these actions a de facto taking of people hostage. The incident is a telling example of how even forceful and diplomatic mechanisms are used by Budapest to exert political pressure on Ukraine.• &nbsp; &nbsp;The stance of the opposition towards Ukraine is not clear-cut. The Tisza party did not support the aid package for Ukraine in the European Parliament, and Magyar himself spoke out against Ukraine's accelerated accession to the EU and the transfer of weapons.• &nbsp; &nbsp;At the same time, the arrival of the new government will almost certainly mean an end to the demonstrative pro-Russian policy and the systematic blocking of EU decisions on Ukraine.• &nbsp; &nbsp;A poll conducted by the Tisza party showed that about 60% of Hungarians support Ukraine's accession to the EU, which indicates that anti-Ukrainian rhetoric is largely a product of political propaganda.• &nbsp; &nbsp;Even if the opposition wins, Hungary will not automatically become an ally of Ukraine, but it may cease to be the main blocker of European policy towards Kyiv.

Hungary is entering a decisive phase of political struggle. Parliamentary elections will be held on 12 April, and for the first time in many years, there is a real prospect that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has ruled the country since 2010, will lose power. For the first time, the opposition has a significant lead over the ruling party. 