Kyiv Security Forum Analytics

The US National Defense Strategy, published on January 24, did not bring any strategic innovations. Like the National Security Strategy released in November 2025, it is fully subordinated to the current administration's ‘America First’ policy.

The key US defence priorities are as follows:

•    defence of the United States' territory on land and at sea, in particular strengthening air defence through the deployment of the Golden Dome system, anti-drone protection, and safeguarding US interests in the Western Hemisphere;
•    containing China in the Indo-Pacific region not through direct confrontation, but through a demonstration of power and the maintenance of a balance that prevents Beijing from dominating the US and its allies;
•    increasing allies' and partners' responsibility for their own defence, with a gradual shift away from their former dependence on Washington, both in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific region;
•    ‘recharging’ the American defence industry, in particular by returning strategic production to the US, reinvesting, supporting innovation and new technologies, including artificial intelligence, and removing outdated regulatory restrictions.

Russia, Iran and North Korea are not considered separate strategic defence priorities. Threats from these countries are mentioned, but in a rather narrow and selective manner.

It is noted that Russia will remain a constant but manageable threat to NATO's eastern members in the foreseeable future. At the same time, the intensification of aggressive tendencies in Moscow's policy in the context of the war against Ukraine is not directly recorded. The main emphasis is placed on the demographic and economic problems of the Russian Federation, as well as on the remaining reserves of its military and industrial potential.

The list of threats to the United States includes Russia's nuclear arsenal, its submarine, space and cyber capabilities. It is assumed that the Ministry of Defence will focus primarily on countering these challenges, while continuing to play a vital role within NATO.

It is separately emphasised that European allies should take primary responsibility for their own conventional defence, while the US will focus on China and the Western Hemisphere. This division of roles is justified not only by the ‘America First’ policy, but also by Europe's significantly higher combined economic and military potential compared to Russia, which, according to the authors of the document, makes Moscow's hegemony on the continent impossible.

As in the National Security Strategy, Russia's aggression against Ukraine is not directly condemned. The authors limit themselves to stating that, as a result of the war, relations between European states and the Russian Federation have significantly weakened, and their normalisation will require active diplomatic involvement from the US.

Washington's efforts to achieve peace in Ukraine are mentioned in the document, but the key role in ensuring the defence of our state is assigned to European partners. The strategy contains no hints of the possibility of providing even limited security guarantees to Ukraine from the United States.

Thus, although the Defence Strategy, unlike the National Security Strategy, at least acknowledges the threats from Moscow, there has been no fundamental shift in the US administration's view of its role in ensuring European security.